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1. Introduction
 Since its universal adoption in 2005 and reaffirmation by the Security Council in 2006, 
the principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has developed into a prominent feature of 
global political discourse.1 Academics and politicians alike have heatedly debated the principle. 
While some proclaim that R2P could end the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes, others hold 
that the principle is merely a continuation of long-standing Western imperialist policies. The 
events in Libya have reinvigorated the R2P debate and could very well determine the future 
course of this emerging principle. Despite the heated debates and the plethora of academic 
literature that R2P has inspired, these discussions have largely been detached from any 
theoretical foundation. Given that international relations theory seeks to explain global politics 
and foreign policy, it would seem that R2P presents a fruitful opportunity for theoretical 
exploration. Can the major international relations theories provide insight into the emergence and 
practice of R2P?
 Four years after its adoption, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon began releasing annual 
reports on R2P, exploring different facets of the principle that he believed needed clarification or 
strengthening. In his first report, Ban Ki-moon offered United Nations (UN) member states a 
new way to conceptualize R2P, transforming the principle from just seven sentences in the World 
Summit Outcome Document into a three pillar framework meant to guide states in fulfilling their 
obligations under R2P. Following an interactive dialogue on the report, the General Assembly 
accepted this vision of R2P. Since then, this three pillar framework has dominated the discourse 
on R2P. While these three pillars help elucidate the principle as a matter of policy, how do they 
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1 See UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1; and UN Security 
Council, Resolution 1674 (2006), 28 April 2006, S/RES/1674, para. 4.
relate, if at all, to the three ‘pillars’ of international relations theory – realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism? In exploring the language, goals, and tactics of the three R2P pillars, remarkable 
parallels become apparent between these pillars and the three major theories of international 
relations. 
 The first pillar, which asserts that states bear the primary responsibility to protect their 
populations from the four crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity, also tacitly asserts a fundamental reconception of state sovereignty. While still fully 
recognizing the authority of the state within its territory, the first pillar shifts sovereignty from an 
absolute to a conditional feature of statehood. As Ban Ki-moon asserts, “The State … remains 
the bedrock of the responsibility to protect, the purpose of which is to build responsible 
sovereignty, not to undermine it.”2 Such a conceptual shift is emblematic of the socially 
constructed nature of international relations advocated by constructivism. Constructivists such as 
Alexander Wendt claim that “Sovereignty is an institution, and so it exists only in virtue of 
certain intersubjective understandings and expectations; there is no sovereignty without an 
other.”3 As such, constructivist theory allows for the changes in identities and interests which 
R2P proposes and indeed depends on.
 From this conceptual foundation, the second pillar of R2P seeks to establish a communal 
responsibility shared among all states to assist each other in fulfilling their first pillar 
responsibilities. Ranging from ‘encouragement’ to material aid, this pillar is meant to support and 
strengthen states that are struggling to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes.4 This 
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2 UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General, 12 January 
2009, A/63/677, para. 13 (emphasis added), http://www.refworld.org/docid/4989924d2.html. 
3 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46 no. 2 (1992): 412, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706858. 
4 UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect, para. 29.
belief that cooperation among states can lead to the mitigation and prevention of human suffering 
is a major tenet of liberalism, specifically liberal institutionalism. Robert Keohane, one of the 
most prominent liberal institutionalists, has asserted that a solid consensus has developed around 
the idea that “global issues require systematic policy coordination and that such coordination 
requires institutions.”5 As such, the UN, regional bodies, and R2P itself have a vital role to play 
in achieving peace. The concept of peace has been a fundamental concern of liberalism. 
Immanuel Kant’s ‘federation of states’ and its promise of ‘perpetual peace’ can be seen as the 
conceptual forebear of modern day international institutions.6 The second pillar’s emphasis on 
supporting economic development and responsive, as well as responsible, government reflects 
Kant’s belief that commerce and representative governance are vital to achieving peace.7
 These ideals of economic and political engagement are suspended in the third pillar, 
which demands “timely and decisive action” when genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity are being perpetrated.8 The third pillar is wholly concerned with 
compelling states to act when “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations.”9 While advocates reiterate again and again that the use of force is reserved as a 
measure of last resort, the mere possibility of its use has proven contentious. The actions taken in 
Libya under the auspices of R2P have further animated the fear that R2P is just military 
intervention in humanitarian clothing. Such controversy seem to strengthen the assertions of 
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5 Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?”, Foreign Policy no. 110 (1998): 84-5, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149278. Verbs have been changed to reflect the proper tense.
6 Immanuel Kant, “Eternal Peace,” The Advocate of Peace 59 no. 5 (1897): 114, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
25751039. 
7 UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect, para. 43-4.
8 Ibid., para. 50. See also World Summit Outcome, para. 139.
9 Ibid.
realists such as John Mearsheimer, who contends that “cooperation takes place in a world that is 
competitive at its core – one where states have powerful incentives to take advantage of other 
states.”10 If this is truly the case, should the NATO intervention in Libya be seen as powerful 
states abusing or ‘taking advantage of’ R2P to justify the ousting of an historically antagonistic 
regime? 
 As this brief exploration of the three pillars shows, each international relations theory has 
something to contribute to elucidating the potential and realities of R2P. While academics tend to 
align themselves with one theoretical perspective, the above exploration demonstrates that all 
three theories are need to arrive at a fuller understanding of R2P’s emergence and practice. In his 
essay “One World, Rival Theories”, Jack Snyder contends that constructivism, liberalism, and 
realism each have a role to play in explaining international relations. As Snyder asserts, “The 
influence of these intellectual constructs extends far beyond university classrooms and tenure 
committees. Policymakers and public commentators invoke elements of all these theories when 
articulating solutions to global security dilemmas.”11 Just as all three pillars are needed to uphold 
R2P, so too are all three theories needed to support and balance one’s understanding of 
international relations. 
 However, as Ban Ki-moon warns, “If the three supporting pillars were of unequal length, 
the edifice of the responsibility to protect could become unstable, leaning precariously in one 
direction or another. Similarly, unless all three pillars are strong the edifice could implode and 
collapse.”12 This is true for the three pillars of international relations theory as well. While each 
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10 John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 no. 3 (1994-5): 13, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078. 
11 Jack Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” Foreign Policy no. 145 (2004): 54, http://www.jstor.org/stable/
4152944. 
12 UN General Assembly, Implementing the responsibility to protect, para. 12.
is essential in understanding international relations, an overemphasis on one theoretical 
perspective leaves both academia and policy impoverished and unbalanced. Presently, the third 
pillar and its realist implications have received a preponderance of academic and political 
attention, forcing R2P discourse to revolve around coercive force and its potential abuse. This in 
turn has lead to insufficient attention being paid to the potential for cooperation and redefining 
interests embodied in the two other pillars and theories. As long as realist assumptions continue 
to dominate the discourse on R2P, there is little chance that the principle can break out of self-
help logic and achieve its full potential. Hence, a rebalancing is needed between these three 
‘parallel pillars’ if R2P is to be fully actualized. Some have already begun to chart this course. 
By conducting a detailed exploration of how realism can strengthen R2P and where realism’s 
assumptions need reevaluation, Adrian Gallagher provides a path forward in rebalancing the 
pillars of international relations and R2P.13
 By exploring each R2P pillar through a particular theoretical lens, this paper seeks to 
provide a cross-theoretical analysis of R2P, an approach that has been found lacking in the R2P 
discourse. Only by rising out of entrenched theoretical positions can the academic and policy 
communities benefit from the insight each theory has to offer. Additionally, this paper argues that 
a rebalancing needs to take place among the pillars of R2P and the pillars of international 
relations theory. Effort spent on defending R2P against claims of Western imperialism and self-
interest is effort not being spent on developing effective preventative measures and meaningful 
cooperation that could mitigate these adverse tendencies, thus creating a self-fulfilling prophesy. 
This is not to say that placing more emphasis on the first two pillars of R2P will resolve the 
! Muscott 5
13 Adrian M. Gallagher, “Clash of Responsibilities: Engaging with Realist Critiques of the R2P,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 4 (2012): 334-357, accessed via ingentaconnect.
dilemmas of self-help and anarchy so well articulated by realist scholars. While constructivism 
may show that these dilemmas are not inherent to the international system, they at present 
continue to dominate global politics. Rather, this paper advocates a rebalancing, not the 
eradication, of the third pillar. Timely and decisive response is critical in achieving R2P’s 
objectives. Additionally, as Ban Ki-moon points out, “it may not always be possible to clearly 
determine whether an activity falls exclusively under one or another of the three pillars….”14 The 
same might be said for the three major theories of international relations; their dialogue mutually 
informs and generates new insight, and hence realism, while needing reevaluation, is still vital to 
the study of international relations.
 Given this inseparability, this paper inherently runs into certain limitations. By organizing 
the argument as a one-on-one comparison of pillar to theory, this paper necessarily presents a 
simplification of both a complex principle and international relations theory more generally. 
Rarely if ever can theory be so neatly categorized without failing to capture the entirety of the 
theory’s scope and argument. However, this does not mean that a necessarily contrived 
simplification cannot provide valuable insight into complex ideas. Indeed, all theory is 
necessarily a simplification of complex relations and concepts. The study of politics is dependent 
on such simplifications to engender as-yet undiscovered truths and new perspectives. What this 
paper seeks to do, then, is to offer a new way to understand the principle of R2P and its place 
within the study of international relations.
 It is critical that a shared understanding of certain concepts be established from the 
outset, hence this paper will begin by defining key terms. The next chapter will be devoted to 
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14 UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response, 25 July 
2012, A/66/874-S/2012/578, para. 12, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/874. 
Snyder’s approach to international relations theory and how his perspective contributes to this 
paper’s discussion of R2P. Next, the paper will begin its exploration of the three R2P and 
theoretical pillars. A chapter will be devoted to the first R2P pillar and its relation to 
constructivism. This chapter will examine their parallels through the theoretical writing of 
Wendt, the advocacy work of Ban Ki-moon, Bellamy, and Gareth Evans, and the critical 
perspective of Noam Chomsky.15 Next, the second pillar and the theoretical works of Keohane 
and Kant will be explored, highlighting the relationship between the second pillar and the liberal 
concepts of international institutionalism, economic interdependence, and democratic peace. 
David Chandler and his critique of who bears the burden of R2P will also be examined. The 
cases of failed R2P action in Darfur and the seeming success of R2P mediation in Kenya 
highlight and provide insight into the concepts explored above. Finally, the third pillar will be 
explored in relation to Mearsheimer’s realist perspective. While Mearsheimer’s analysis of why 
insecurity hinders cooperation helps to explain the continued dominance of military power in 
foreign policy, Mary O’Connell demonstrates that an R2P heavily biased toward coercive action 
fails to achieve its guiding mandate: to protect populations from mass atrocities. This paper will 
conclude with an exploration of the path ahead and how advocates and academics alike can work 
to rebalance the pillars of R2P and international relations theory.
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15 The work of Bellamy and Evans will be recurring features throughout the three pillar sections. As advocates of 
R2P who approach the principle from very different perspectives, each provides a unique contribution to this paper’s 
discussion of R2P. Additionally, as his 2009 report provided the three pillar framework for R2P, Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon’s work will also maintain a constant presence throughout the three pillar sections.
2. Defining Key Terms
 The Responsibility to Protect – which delineates the individual and collective 
responsibility of states to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity – has a history extending much further than the 2005 World Summit.  
Its articulation and development have taken place over the course of more than half a century. 
The Genocide Convention, which entered into force in 1951, was the first international treaty to 
make “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such” a crime under international law, obligating states to intervene when 
such acts were perpetrated.16 Since then, the international community has continued to develop 
legal instruments that have established war crimes, crimes against humanity, and (more 
ambiguously) ethnic cleansing as prosecutable crimes under international law.17 While some 
claim that the presence of these well-established legal instruments make R2P redundant, 
Christoph Mikulaschek notes that, “The added value of RtoP is not so much the novelty of 
international action to protect populations from mass atrocities, but rather the concept’s value as 
an organizing principle that ties different normative strands together and that has broad popular 
appeal.”18 
 In addition to these legal instruments, academics and political figures through their work 
and advocacy have also made significant contributions in the development of R2P. Francis Deng, 
then serving as Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, 
! Muscott 8
16 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 
1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78 no. 1021, Article II.
17 Please refer to Appendix A for the full definitions of the crimes of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant conventions, treaties, charters, and case rulings.
18 Christoph Mikulaschek, “The United Nations Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process, 
and Practice,” (paper presented at the 39th International Peace Institute Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping, Vienna, Austria, March 01, 2011), 22. Accessed via http://www.ipacademy.org. 
first explored the concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, the principal tenet of R2P, in his 
1996 report “Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa”. The humanitarian 
crises that occurred throughout the 1990s and the inconsistent responses of the international 
community toward them led Secretary-General Kofi Annan to pose the following question to UN 
member states in his Millennium Report: “If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica, to 
gross and systematic violation of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?”19 It was this question that animated the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and led the commission to produce its report, “The Responsibility 
to Protect”. This document coined the term ‘responsibility to protect’ and laid the foundation for 
what states would adopt at the World Summit in 2005 as the UN principle of R2P. 
 While the ICISS report paved the way for R2P’s debate and adoption in 2005, its vision 
of R2P should not be conflated or equated with the principle as it stands within international law. 
As Bellamy asserts, “The norm that emerged from 2005 was … quite different to the concept 
proposed by ICISS in 2001 and it was precisely these changes that made consensus possible.”20 
This leads Bellamy to conclude that “the practice of RtoP should draw exclusively from that 
consensus and not from earlier proposals such as that put forth by ICISS and others.”21 While 
both Bellamy and Evans are advocates of R2P, it is here where the two fundamentally diverge. 
Evans, who co-chaired the ICISS and claims credit for the very term ‘responsibility to protect’, 
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19 Kofi A. Annan,‘We the Peoples’: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: UN Department 
of Public Information, 2000), 48, http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm. 
20 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From words to deeds (New York: Routledge, 2011), 9.
21 Ibid.
advocates a vision of R2P that is drawn directly from the pages of the ICISS report.22 While 
recognizing the value and importance of the ICISS report, this paper concurs with Bellamy’s 
argument that extrapolating R2P beyond what states agreed to in 2005 has little legal foundation 
and risks corroding the consensus that has been so tenuously built. 
 Two cases in particular demonstrate the dangers of conflating R2P with the ICISS report: 
the Russian invasion of Georgia and France’s response to Cyclone Nargis, both of which 
occurred in 2008. In August of that year, Russia launched a unilateral military campaign against 
Georgia, ostensibly in response to Georgia’s actions in the region of South Ossetia. Russia went 
so far as to take a major Georgian city, Gori, by military force.23 Russia justified its actions by 
asserting that the Georgian army was committing, or imminently about to commit, mass atrocity 
crimes in South Ossetia, which Russia claimed made its actions against Georgia consistent with 
R2P.24 Whether Russia’s claims were valid or invalid, what was unequivocally true was that there 
was insufficient consensus on whether the events in South Ossetia warranted such a forceful 
response. Furthermore, the R2P adopted by UN member states in 2005 specifically prohibits 
such unsanctioned unilateral action to prevent precisely this situation. While clearly proscribed in 
the World Summit Outcome definition, the ICISS report could easily be used to support Russia’s 
actions.
 The ICISS report asserts that, “Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result 
of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or 
unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
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22 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2008), 5.
23 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, 55.
24 Ibid., 55-6.
responsibility to protect.”25 Given the legally vague criteria for intervention presented by the 
ICISS, Russia would have little trouble justifying that ‘serious harm’ was occurring in South 
Ossetia. While such vague criteria for intervention alone provide ample opportunity for the abuse 
of military intervention, the ICISS report offers further opportunity when it states, “it is 
unrealistic to expect that concerned states will rule out other means and forms of action” when 
the Security Council fails to respond, ‘other’ in this case referring to unsanctioned unilateral 
action.26 The ICISS report, while intending to compel states to respond to mass atrocities, is so 
ill-defined as to potentially cause more human suffering through unchecked military intervention 
than it prevents.
 The dangers of such vague terms as ‘serious suffering’ are also apparent in the case of 
Cyclone Nargis, which hit Burma in May of 2008. This natural disaster caused massive human 
suffering, leaving 138,000 dead or missing and over one million displaced.27 When the Burmese 
state proved incapable of responding to the magnitude of the crisis and refused to allow foreign 
aid to enter the country, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner sought to use R2P to justify 
military intervention as a means of forcibly assisting desperate Burmese civilians.28 Despite his 
best efforts, the vast majority of states as well as Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the 
Responsibility to Protect Edward Luck rejected this extrapolation of R2P to suffering caused by 
natural disasters.29 Evans, while acknowledging that the negligence of the Burmese state in the 
face of such a disaster seems a crime unto itself, agrees that such a crisis is “not normally, on the 
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25 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa, ON, 
Canada: International Development Research Centre, 2001) “Core Principles,” para. 1, subsection B.
26 Ibid., para. 6.39.
27 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, 56.
28 Ibid., 57.
29 Ibid., 58.
face of it, about protecting people from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity’,” here recognizing that R2P is not driven by a general mandate but rather must 
be limited to the four atrocity crimes.30
 While both of these cases demonstrate overreach by two permanent members of the 
Security Council, they also reveal the strength of international consensus on the World Summit 
Outcome Document’s authority in defining R2P as a principle of international law. As Bellamy 
asserts, “relatively powerful states invoked RtoP to legitimize the use or threat of military force 
but other states and analysts found their arguments unpersuasive. As a result, Russia failed to 
translate its intervention into a legitimate basis for recognizing South Ossetia and France failed 
to galvanize support for the forcible delivery of aid.”31 For all of these reasons, this paper will 
operate off of the definition of R2P as defined at the World Summit, which is as follows:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early 
warning capability. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means […] to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-
by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. […] We also intend to commit 
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31 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, 69.
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assist those which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out.32
Ban Ki-moon’s three pillar framework, while lacking the binding force of a Security Council 
resolution, was adopted by the General Assembly in 2009 and hence reflects a general consensus 
within the international community that the three pillars contribute to the elucidation of R2P. 
This framework, used to structure the argument of this paper, will therefore be used to 
supplement, not replace, the World Summit definition. 
 The divergent debates surround R2P’s meaning and scope requires that the term be 
explicitly defined, which is why it has been explored and defended to such lengths above. 
However, another term used throughout this paper also requires some clarification, this being the 
term ‘international community’. For the purposes of this paper, ‘international community’ refers 
to UN member states and by extension their governments and officials. States, however, are not 
the only actors in global politics. The 21st century has witnessed the growing role of non-state 
actors in international relations, a role which this author fully acknowledges and believes 
deserves serious study. This paper’s use of the term ‘international community’, then, should not 
be seen as a failure to recognize the role of non-state actors in global politics, but rather as a 
reflection of this paper’s scope. While non-state actors are certainly a part of R2P – as advocates, 
as critics, as defenders of civilians, as perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes – this paper is 
concerned primarily with how R2P has been agreed to and operationalized by states. This focus 
on states is reflected in the theoretical writings employed by this paper, further justifying the 
restriction of the term ‘international community’ to mean UN member states.
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32 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, para. 138-9.
 Finally, this paper will adopt Mearsheimer’s definition of ‘international institutions’, 
which are defined as, “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and 
compete with each other. They prescribe acceptable forms of state behavior, and proscribe 
unacceptable kinds of behavior.”33 These institutions are in turn “usually incorporated into a 
formal international organization”. This definition captures the normative force of R2P both on 
its own terms and as a principle of the UN.
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33 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 8.
3. Embracing a Multi-theoretical Approach
 In setting out the definition of R2P that this paper will employ, the previous section 
detailed particular developments within international relations that led to, tested, and helped 
solidify the present understanding of R2P. These events did not occur within a vacuum; the 
political realities and actions from the 1950s through today have influenced and shaped 
academia, and vice versa. Hence, international relations theory constitutes a vital component of 
any attempt to effect or change global politics. Theory, in essence, attempts to explain the world 
around us. How accurately it does so, however, is another matter, one which occupies Snyder in 
his essay “One World, Rival Theories”. 
 Snyder begins by posing a question to the reader, one which bears great import for the 
future study of international relations: “Instead of radical change, academia has adjusted existing 
theories to meet new realities. Has this approach succeeded? Does international relations theory 
still have something to tell policymakers?”34 The emergence of R2P surely counts among the 
‘new realities’ which confront states and academics alike. How well does international relations 
theory capture the assumptions, aspirations, and pitfalls embodied within R2P? It is exactly this 
question that this paper seeks to answer. But first, international relations theory must be found 
capable of explaining international relations on a more general level than the principle of R2P. A 
theory which helps explain R2P, while helpful, will prove to be of little utility if it cannot situate 
itself within the wider context of international relations. Hence, this section is devoted to 
exploring whether international relations theory can still account for global politics on a larger 
scale before moving on to a more detailed exploration of R2P in later chapters.
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 Snyder focuses his work on the three major theories of international relations: realism, 
liberalism, and “an updated form of idealism called ‘constructivism’.”35 He offers pithy 
encapsulations of these theories, useful in establishing the major aspects of each theory: 
“Realism focuses on the shifting distribution of power among states. Liberalism highlights the 
rising number of democracies and the turbulence of democratic transitions. Idealism [or 
constructivism] illuminates the changing norms of sovereignty, human rights, and international 
justice”.36 After exploring each of these theories in turn, Snyder concludes that “Each theory 
offers a filter for looking at a complicated picture. As such, they help explain the assumptions 
behind political rhetoric about foreign policy. Even more important, the theories act as a 
powerful check on each other. Deployed effectively, they reveal the weaknesses in arguments 
that can lead to misguided policies.”37 This paper draws the same conclusion, arguing that each 
theory is essential in explicating international relations and R2P. In order to understand how 
these theories can help or hinder good policy, one must examine both their contributions and 
shortcomings. It is to this examination that this chapter now turns. 
 This chapter will explore each of these three theories, both in isolation from and in 
dialogue with each other. The theoretical writings of Mearsheimer, Keohane, Kant, and Wendt 
will be utilized to test Snyder’s assertions regarding the theories’ relative strengths and 
weaknesses. After conducting this cross-theoretical exploration, this paper will conclude by 
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Realism
 Arguably the most ‘pragmatic’ of the three international relations theories, realism has 
held a prominent position in global politics from the Cold War to the present day. Central to 
realist theory is power – its distribution, acquisition, and exertion in the international system. As 
Snyder asserts, “At realism’s core is the belief that international affairs is a struggle for power 
among self-interested states.”38 For realists, power considerations effect all aspects of global 
politics, including participation in international institutions. Mearsheimer asserts that 
“cooperation among states has its limits, mainly because it is constrained by the dominating logic 
of security competition, which no amount of cooperation can eliminate.”39 As such, Mearsheimer 
arrives at the pessimistic conclusion that, “institutions are not an important cause of peace.”40 
 Realism’s dismissal of international institutions as potential sites for meaningful 
cooperation among states stems largely from its prioritization of pragmatism over idealism. 
Snyder writes that “realism claimed to be an antidote to the naive belief that international 
institutions alone can preserve peace,” a belief which realists see as detached from political 
reality.41 Despite this skepticism regarding international institutions, realism does not reject their 
utility outright. States can cooperate through institutions, but this cooperation will necessarily 
“reflect calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power.”42 
Institutions, then, are less the sites of dynamic engagement than another international arena 
where power politics are played out.
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 This intense pragmatism makes realism an overwhelmingly pessimistic theory. Even 
Mearsheimer arrives at this conclusion, stating “[Realism] depicts a world of stark and harsh 
competition, and it holds out little promise of making that world more benign.”43 Mearsheimer’s 
assessment is accurate; realism offers little in the way of mending or even mitigating the anarchic 
system in which states operate. It is exactly for this reason that the other two theories are needed, 
to balance realism’s fatalistic worldview and subsequent aggressive tendencies. Liberalists 
criticize realism heavily for this worldview, arguing that “realism has a stunted vision that cannot 
account for progress in relations between nations.”44 Additionally, Realism’s argument that its 
core assumptions – anarchy, military capability, uncertainty, states’ overriding drive for survival 
and capacity for strategic thinking – incentivize states to behave aggressively does not take into 
account the socially constructed nature of the interests and identities which produce these 
incentives.45 This failure to recognize the socially bound nature of incentives, a recognition 
which forms the basis of constructivist theory, is partly why realism arrives at such pessimistic 
conclusions. While not directly discussed in this paper, realism’s state-centricity also fails to 
account for the growing impact of non-state actors in global politics. For all of these reasons, a 
realist perspective alone fails to provide a complete picture of contemporary global politics.
 While realism may need to be tempered and supplemented by other theories, it still has 
much to offer to the study and practice of global politics. Realism appreciates that states often 
measure power relative to other states. Hence, policy constructed with only absolute-gains in 
mind will most likely fail, especially when it involves international cooperation. As Mearsheimer 
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contends, “I am not suggesting that relative-gains considerations make cooperation impossible; 
my point is simply that they can pose serious impediment to cooperation and must therefore be 
taken into account when developing a theory of cooperation among states.”46 The importance of 
relative power is nowhere more apparent than in international security. At present, realism is the 
only theory that can explain the “continued centrality of military strength and the persistence of 
conflict” despite the world’s increasing economic interdependence, a reality that confronts the 
liberal idea that commerce leads to peace.47  Realism also warns that “states will suffer if they 
overreach,” calling for states to practice prudence when it comes to military action.48 Such 
prudence is especially warranted when it comes to humanitarian intervention. While advocating 
war as a legitimate tool of state policy, Mearsheimer cautions that “wars should not be fought for 
idealistic purposes,” a proscription particularly pertinent to the topic of this paper.49 Snyder 
ultimately arrives at quite an optimistic assessment of realism, arguing that states who adopt a 
nuanced understanding of the theory “can mitigate the causes of war by finding ways to reduce 
the danger they pose to each other.”50 Additionally, Snyder argues that realism is not inherently 
amoral. Rather, “its advocates emphasize that a ruthless pragmatism about power can actually 
yield a more peaceful world, if not an ideal one.”51 Given these insights, realism remains vital to 
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  Liberalism has held a privileged place within Western political thought. As Snyder points 
out, “Liberalism has such a powerful presence that the entire U.S. political spectrum, from 
neoconservatives to human rights advocates, assumes it as largely self-evident.”52 Indeed, liberal 
ideas such as encouraging economic interdependence and promoting democratic institutions have 
become staples of US foreign policy. The dominance of liberalism can in some part be accredited 
to the more optimistic outlook it offers to its adherents. Mearsheimer begrudgingly 
acknowledges the appeal of liberalism, saying “there is a powerful demand in the United States 
for alternative ways of looking at the world, and especially for theories that square with basic 
American values. Institutionalist theories nicely meet these requirements, and that is the main 
source of their appeal to policymakers and scholars.”53 Liberalism directly counters the 
pessimism of realists like Mearsheimer, positing that it is possible for states to pull themselves 
out of anarchy and forge economic and institutional ties which promote peace.54 This promise of 
peace through commerce, cooperation, and democracy has led many international relations 
scholars to explore the validity of these claims.55
 While Mearsheimer may disagree, this exploration has found that liberalism’s assertions 
are credible. As Snyder states, “the belief that democracies never fight wars against each other is 
the closest thing we have to an iron law in social science.”56 Kant, the first to articulate what has 
come to be called ‘democratic peace theory’, provides the following account for why 
democracies are less prone to violent conflict: “Where the consent of the citizens of the state is 
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required to determine whether there shall be war or not, as must necessarily be the case where 
the republican constitutions is in force, nothing is more natural than that they should hesitate 
much before entering on so perilous a game.”57 To put this in modern parlance, “Because elected 
leaders are accountable to the people (who bear the burdens of war), liberals expect that 
democracies will not attack each other and will regard each other’s regimes as legitimate and 
nonthreatening.”58 Democracy, then, mitigates the possibility of war by holding states directly 
accountable to those who most suffer the anguish of war.
 While the form of governance is a crucial component of liberalism’s argument for 
democratic pacificism, so too is commerce’s ability to promote friendly state-to-state relations. In 
his work Kant describes how commerce brought citizens of different states into contact with each 
other, allowing them to establish relations and standards of living which further entrenched these 
citizens’ unwilling to break ties by entering into war. “Through this interchange,” Kant asserts, 
“men came into a peaceful relation to one another, and even those far removed from one another 
were brought into intelligent association and friendly relationship.”59
 These two central tenets of liberalism – democratic governance and economic 
interdependence – form the foundation on which liberal theories of cooperation through 
international institutions are built. Snyder notes the centrality of these tenets to liberal theories on 
cooperation, stating, “Liberalism highlights the cooperative potential of mature democracies, 
especially when working together through effective institutions”.60 Proponents of liberal 
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institutionalism assert that international institutions have become vital for the maintenance of 
order in global politics.61 Keohane, a prominent liberal institutionalist, asserts that institutions 
foster mutually beneficial cooperation by lowering the costs and risks of cooperation.62 “To be 
effective in the twenty-first century,” Keohane asserts, “modern democracy requires international 
institutions.”63
 However, as liberal institutionalism continued to develop, it increasingly broke ties with 
its idealistic roots and began adopting realist assumptions of self-interest and self-help.64 This 
shift has invoked the criticism of theorists such as Wendt, who asserts that “By adopting such 
reasoning, liberals concede to neorealists the causal powers of anarchic structure”.65 He further 
contends that “‘Strong’ liberals should be troubled by the dichotomous privileging of structure 
over process, since transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations 
of structure.”66 Another form of transformation – democratization – has also proven contentious 
for liberalism. As Snyder notes, “Countries transitioning to democracy, with weak political 
institutions, are more likely than other states to get into international and civil wars.”67 Hence, 
the ‘democratic peace’ does not seem to apply to emerging democracies.68 While liberals 
acknowledge the volatility of new democracies, this volatility still challenges liberal assumptions 
about the pacifying effects of democracy. Indeed, even mature democracies are not always 
pacifistic, demonstrated by the tendency of powerful Western democracies to launch ‘messianic 
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struggles’ for democratization.69 Snyder asserts that “It was precisely American democracy’s 
tendency to oscillate between self-righteous crusading and jaded isolationism that prompted 
early Cold War realists’ call for a more calculated, prudent foreign policy.”70 As it currently 
stands, it seems that democracy can only promise peace for some, not all.
 Liberalism, specifically liberal institutionalism, also struggles to motivate the compliance 
of powerful states such as the US in international institutions. Mearsheimer asserts that this is 
because “The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can 
maintain their share of world power, or even increase it.”71 Hence, when these institutions cease 
to be to their advantage, powerful states excuse themselves from their institutional obligations. 
Mearsheimer concludes that “They [liberal institutionalists] apparently concede that their theory 
only applies when relative-gains considerations matter little or hardly at all.”72 The inability of 
liberalism to overcome relative power and gains considerations is one of the theory’s greatest 
weaknesses.
 Despite these limitations, liberalism and international institutions still play a vital role in 
describing and coordinating international relations. The ‘democratic peace theory’ still holds 
among mature democracies and is one of the few seemingly irrefutable theories in international 
relations. Economic interdependence has become an increasingly important feature of the 
international system, an interdependence which is increasingly being coordinated by 
international institutions. After considering the weaknesses of liberal institutionalism as detailed 
above, Snyder concludes that “international institutions can nonetheless help coordinate 
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outcomes that are in the long-term mutual interest of both the hegemon and … weaker states.”73 
Liberalism, then, is still crucial for understanding contemporary international relations.
Constructivism
 While realism and liberalism both seek to explain and modify the behavior of states in an 
anarchic international system, constructivism seeks to challenge the fundamental assumptions on 
which both of these theories base their conclusions. Snyder’s assessment of constructivism in 
relation to these two theories holds that, “Whereas realists dwell on the balance of power and 
liberals on the power of international trade and democracy, constructivists believe that debates 
about ideas are the fundamental building blocks of international life.”74 These ideas, often taken 
for granted by realist and liberal theory, are constantly being renegotiated and developed both 
consciously and subconsciously. Given this dynamism, constructivists find the realist argument 
that identities and interests are fixed and immutable to be absurd.75 For constructivists like 
Wendt, states always possess the agency to alter their identities and interests, since “[t]he fact 
that roles are ‘taken’ means that, in principle, actors always have the capacity for ‘character 
planning’ – for engaging in critical self-reflection and choices designed to bring about changes in 
our lives.”76 Hence, as Wendt puts it, anarchy is what states make of it.
 Troubled by liberalism’s dependence on realist assumptions of self-interest and structure 
to assert its own ideas regarding process, Wendt declares that his objective is to develop “a 
constructivist argument … on behalf of the liberal claim that international institutions can 
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transform state identities and interests.”77 For Wendt, this dependency on realist assumptions 
undermines the whole liberal agenda of transforming state behavior through institutions, since 
“Regimes cannot change identities and interests if the latter are taken as given.”78 Snyder himself 
explores how state identities and interests have indeed changed over the course of history, from 
the Protestant reformation to the emergence of the sovereign state.79 Since such historical shifts 
in international relations demonstrate the transmutable nature of identity and interests, 
constructivism asserts that process can alter the structure of international relations.80
 Although presenting a strong argument for the importance and changeability of ideas and 
beliefs, constructivism ultimately does little to directly challenge the realist reality that currently 
dominates global politics. While Wendt’s argument successfully undermines the key realist 
assumption that anarchy causally determines state identities and interests, Wendt ultimately ends 
up paving a constructivist path to the realist present.81 As Snyder states, “Constructivists are 
good at describing changes in norms and ideas, but they are weak on the material and 
institutional circumstances necessary to support the emergence of consensus about new values 
and ideas.”82 While challenging realism’s fundamental causal assumptions, constructivism still 
lacks the theoretical capacity to explain how state behavior and identity can be changed here and 
now.
 While constructivism may not be able to point the way to changing current global 
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interest formation provides a significant contribution to the study of international relations. As 
Wendt asserts, “If society ‘forgets’ what a university is, the powers and practices of professor and 
student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer 
enemies, ‘the cold war is over’. It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which 
organize our actions.”83 This insight demonstrates that self-help and power politics are not 
inherent aspects of international relations, but rather products of an international process of 
socialization.84 Constructivist theory therefore offers a vital contribution to the study of 
international relations.
Conclusions
 This section has sought to demonstrate that the three major international relations theories 
– realism, liberalism, and constructivism – each provide crucial analytical tools for 
understanding and explaining global politics. While each theory approaches global politics from 
different assumptions and goals, it is this varied perspective that allows these theories to each 
provide unique insight. As Snyder asserts, “One of the principle contributions that international 
relations theory can make is not predicting the future but providing the vocabulary and 
conceptual framework to ask hard questions of those who think that changing the world is 
easy.”85 Indeed, the battle to establish and implement the principle of R2P demonstrates that this 
isn’t so. With this multi-theoretical approach established and defended, this paper now moves on 
to explore how these three theories can help elucidate the three pillars of R2P. 
! Muscott 26
83 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 397.
84 Ibid., 394.
85 Snyder, “One World, Rival Theories,” 62.
4. Constructing the First Pillar: Constructivist Insights into the Development of the 
Responsibility to Protect
 At the time of this writing, the ‘responsibility to protect’ is a relatively new principle.  
Despite the recent nature of R2P, the crimes which animated the development of this principle 
date back to time immemorial. As charted in chapter 2., the principle as it was adopted in 2005 
was the product of decades of advocacy, scholarship, and debate which sought to identify the 
perpetration of mass atrocities as a crime under international law that compelled international 
action. This discourse sought to alter fundamental concepts in international relations, from the 
enforceability of international law to the very definition of state sovereignty. To study R2P, then, 
is to study the power that ideas can have in changing identities, interests, and norms of behavior. 
The power of ideas is the principle concern of constructivism, making this theory an apt 
framework to employ to understand the development, formation, and adoption of R2P. 
 This chapter will examine the ‘first pillar’ of R2P, defined by Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon as “the enduring responsibility of the State to protect its populations, whether nationals or 
not, from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their 
incitement.”86 To understand how universal consensus was reached around the idea of 
sovereignty as a responsibility, this chapter will explore the process of negotiation and 
renegotiation that led up to R2P’s adoption and continues to the present day. Wendt’s exploration 
of the importance of process in influencing and changing state identities and practices will 
provide insight into how R2P came to be articulated in its present form. While R2P has certainly 
changed the language and discourse around sovereignty and the perpetration of mass atrocities, it 
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is yet unclear whether the principle has changed state identity or interests. Chomsky’s 
exploration of the troubled history of humanitarian efforts demonstrates that it will take more 
than words and ideas to change entrenched state interests and practices. While such criticism 
helps balance the sometimes overly idealistic aspirations of R2P’s advocates, this criticism 
should be utilized to improve R2P rather than reject the principle outright. This chapter will 
conclude that, while R2P continues to be debated and renegotiated, it has begun to change the 
discourse on mass atrocities, providing a critical first step in engaging the international 
community in its second and third pillar responsibilities.
Developing a Responsibility to Protect
 While R2P attempts to redefine the way that states relate and interact with their 
populations and the international community, the mass atrocity crimes which led to the 
principle’s articulation predate the emergence of the state as an actor in global politics. As Evans 
sadly acknowledges, “Massacres of the innocent, forced displacement of populations, large-scale 
sexual violence and humiliation, and the wanton destruction of civilian property have been going 
on since the dawn of civilization.”87 Even as states solidified into individual political entities, a 
Hobbesian logic of ‘all against all’ continued to dominate in which security could only be 
guaranteed through might and the capacity to use force.88 For Wendt, the inception of 
sovereignty changed the nature of this game. “The principle of sovereignty,” Wendt asserts, 
“transforms this situation by providing a social basis for the individuality and security of 
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states.”89 Sovereignty not only created the modern day ‘sovereign state’, but also established a 
particular relationship between states, one defined by “a mutual recognition of one another’s 
right to exercise exclusive political authority within territorial limits.”90 This relationship in turn 
created boundaries of identity: ‘international’ versus ‘national’, ‘foreign’ versus ‘domestic’. 
 While these socially constructed boundaries may have helped to mitigate the anarchy of a 
Hobbesian state of nature, it is exactly these boundaries that Evans holds responsible for the 
long-standing indifference of states in the face of mass atrocities. “Thus sovereignty … meant 
immunity from outside scrutiny or sanction: what happened within a state’s borders and its 
territorial possessions, however grotesque and morally indefensible, was nobody else’s business. 
In the history of ideas, there have been few that have prevailed to more destructive effect.”91 
After recounting the numerous massacres that followed the establishment of this concept – from 
the Boer War to Stalin’s gulags – Evans concludes that the principle of sovereignty has led to the 
institutionalization of indifference.92
 The principle of sovereignty, however, was shaken to its core following the horrors of 
WWII. The millions of lives methodologically processed and destroyed through the German state 
apparatus led to a crisis of faith regarding the inviolability of state sovereignty. The period 
following WWII saw the development of numerous institutions meant to check the excesses of 
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continued creation of human rights instruments, mass atrocities continued to be perpetrated. The 
horrors of Rwanda and Srebrenica, which scarred the last decade of the 20th century, gave the 
international community pause. These events caused Kofi Annan to question the principle of 
non-intervention in the Millennium Report and inspired the creation of the ICISS report. During 
this period, state actors began a process of self-reflection that would culminate in the universal 
adoption of R2P at the World Summit in 2005. This process self-analysis is examined by Wendt, 
who asserts that: 
The exceptional, conscious choosing to transform or transcend roles has at least two 
preconditions. First, there must be a reason to think of oneself in novel terms. This would 
most likely stem from the presence of new social situations that cannot be managed in 
terms of preexisting self-conceptions. Second, the expected costs of intentional role 
change – the sanctions imposed by others with whom one interacted in previous roles – 
cannot be greater than its rewards. When these conditions are present, actors can engage 
in self-reflection and practice specifically designed to transform their identities and 
interests and thus to ‘change the games’ in which they are embedded.94
The genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity witnessed in WWII, 
Rwanda, and the Former Yugoslavia provided the catalyst for states to reevaluate state identity 
and what it meant to be a ‘sovereign’ state in the twenty-first century.
 Bellamy’s exploration of the negotiations that took place leading up to the World Summit 
and the nearly insurmountable obstacles the principle faced along the way demonstrate that this 
attempt at intentional transformation is far from easy.95 From late 2004 up until early August of 
2005, negotiations on the principle had been making steady process. The idea to have criteria for 
coercive action was dropped and the primacy of the Security Council as a ‘check’ on Western 
imperialism was reaffirmed. As the R2P debate was about to close, the United States appointed 
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John Bolton as the US Permanent Representative to the UN. Bolton, who is staunchly anti-UN, 
dedicated himself to the dismantling of the consensus that had been built around R2P and 
numerous other issues. With less than three days until the World Summit, R2P had been removed 
from the list of agreed issues. It was only through somewhat ingenious political maneuvering by 
UN leadership that Bolton’s obstruction was overcome, allowing R2P to make it onto the World 
Summit Outcome Document. This vision of R2P was unanimously adopted by the General 
Assembly in resolution 60/1 and would be reaffirmed by the Security Council a year later in 
resolution 1674 (2006).
 Through this exploration of the maneuverings, negotiations, and politics required to 
achieve consensus on R2P, one can see that R2P is the product of complex social processes that 
were fully dependent on the development of favorable relationships and terms between delegates 
(and to some extent pure luck). In his 2009 report, Ban Ki-moon acknowledges the ideological 
battle that had to be waged to achieve the universal adoption of R2P:
The 2005 World Summit was one of the largest gatherings of Heads of State and 
Government in history. As expected, there were intense and contentious deliberations on 
a number of issues, including on the responsibility to protect. On some important issues, 
such as disarmament and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it proved 
impossible to find consensus language. It is therefore a tribute to both the determination 
and foresight of the assembled world leaders and to their shared understanding of the 
urgency of the issue that they were able to agree on such detailed provisions regarding the 
responsibility to protect. Their determination to move the responsibility to protect from 
promise to practice reflects both painful historical lessons and the evolution of legal 
standards and political imperatives.96
The ability for debate to create a collective understanding among states that sovereignty as 
immutable territoriality, which had for centuries defined and shaped the interests and behavior of 
states, was no longer tenable and had to be altered can only be explained through a constructivist 
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perspective. As Wendt asserts, “in the realist view anarchy justifies disinterest in the institutional 
transformation of identities and interests; … I argue that self-help and power politics do not 
follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help 
world, this is due to process, not structure.”97 R2P is part of a new international process which 
challenges this self-help conception of state identity by redefining what it means to be a state. 
This process of identity reformation is embodied in the first pillar of R2P. 
Changing State Identities and Interests
 Constructivist theory seeks to demonstrate that no part of the international system is 
‘given’; rather, every aspect, including the system’s structure, is the result of intersubjective 
relationships and socialization.98 This is especially true when it comes to sovereignty and the 
state. As Wendt argues, “The sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a 
once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice.”99 It is practice, 
therefore, that defines the state, not the other way around. This leads Wendt to conclude that “If 
states find themselves in a self-help system, this is because their practices made it that way. 
Changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes the system.”100
 Changing state practice in order to change an international system permissive to the 
perpetration of mass atrocities is the principle objective of R2P. The first pillar of R2P largely 
seeks to facilitate this change through a redefinition of the concept of sovereignty. The first pillar 
clearly states that “The responsibility to protect, first and foremost, is a matter of State 
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responsibility, because prevention begins at home and the protection of populations is a defining 
attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the twenty-first century.”101 In equating R2P with 
sovereignty, Ban Ki-moon presents R2P as an intrinsic feature of the modern state. 
 In fact, a defining feature of R2P discourse is its continual assertions that it does not 
undermine sovereignty, but rather enhances it or simply builds on existing international law. This 
is evidenced repeatedly throughout the Secretary-General’s delineation of the first pillar. In 
asserting that “The responsibility derives both from the nature of State sovereignty and from the 
pre-existing and continuing legal obligations of States, not just from the relatively recent 
enunciation and acceptance of the responsibility to protect,” the Secretary-General is tying the 
principle of R2P to sovereignty as well as previously articulated state obligations.102 Wendt 
provides insight as to why advocates of R2P may be so determined to link the principle with 
sovereignty and demonstrate legal precedent: “The process of creating institutions is one of 
internalizing new understandings of self and other, of acquiring new role identities, not just of 
creating external constraints on the behavior of exogenously constituted actors.”103 R2P as an 
institution can clearly be seen as ‘creating external constraints’ by demanding that states protect 
their populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
However, as Wendt states, institutions cannot be formed solely through punitive means. States 
must internalize these institutions if they are to truly alter behavior. As Ban Ki-moon asserts, 
“The obligations of R2P need to be internalized, transformed from an abstract international 
principle into domestic law.”104 Therefore, the linkage of R2P with sovereignty and previous 
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legal precedence can be seen as an attempt to facilitate this internalization by weaving R2P into 
standing international law and the principle of sovereignty, one of the most internalized 
institutions in international relations. 
 By appropriating a concept that has become almost synonymous with statehood, R2P 
seeks to alter the very foundation on which the modern state was built. Indeed, Wendt argues that 
sovereignty is the first of three ways in which state identity can be transformed.105 Understood 
this way, R2P’s efforts to redefine sovereignty is about more than removing a justification for 
inaction in the face of mass atrocities. By redefining sovereignty from the ‘institutionalized 
indifference’ bemoaned by Evans to a ‘responsibility to protect’, R2P is in essence attempting to 
transform what it means to be a state. 
 Indeed, R2P employs each of Wendt’s methods of state identity transformation. Wendt’s 
second method, the evolution of cooperation, receives its own pillar in R2P.106 However, even 
within the first pillar – which is dedicated to outlining each state’s individual responsibilities – 
states are reminded of the increasingly interdependent and globalized nature of international 
relations and the need to be open to international assistance.107 This cooperation is a precondition 
for Wendt’s third method of state identity transformation, which requires intentional effort to 
transform egoistic identities into collective identities.108 By calling for open and cooperative 
relations between states, the Secretary-General and R2P advocates are calling on states to view 
the international community not as a threat but rather an ally in building responsible sovereignty. 
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In redefining the relationship between states from one of hostility to cooperation, R2P attempts 
to realize Wendt’s vision of ‘collective’ security, a system in which “states identify positively 
with one another so that the security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all.”109 This idea 
of collective security embodies the ultimate objective of R2P: to create a sense of international 
responsibility for the protection of all populations from the four mass atrocity crimes. 
 In redefining sovereignty, encouraging cooperation, and expending considerable effort to 
foster a sense of collective obligation and identity, R2P employs every tool in Wendt’s 
conceptual toolbox to transform state identity and subsequently state behavior. Such rhetorical 
efforts, however, do not necessarily translate into real-world implementation. Even worse, new 
discourses can be abused and manipulated to justify the continuance of unacceptable state 
practices. It is this potential for state abuse of R2P that concerns Chomsky. He sees little 
distinction between R2P and its ‘cousin’ humanitarian intervention.110 In addition to the 
historical baggage of this relationship, Chomsky asserts that “virtually every use of force in 
international affairs has been justified in terms of R2P, including the worst monsters.”111 For 
Chomsky, Hitler and Mussolini’s claims of acting on behalf of suffering populations differ little 
from the modern day principle of R2P.112 Given the historical use of ‘civilian protection’ as a 
means of justifying coercive action, Chomsky questions how ‘emerging’ of a norm R2P truly 
is.113 R2P, then, is nothing more than a continuation of the civilizing mission initiated by Western 
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states centuries ago, a mission still riddled with inconsistent and largely convenient 
application.114 
 The charges that Chomsky presents against R2P are grave and deserve serious 
consideration as the principle continues to develop and be invoked. Bellamy’s exploration of 
cases that have arisen since R2P’s adoption demonstrates that the principle is still subject to the 
whims of powerful states.115 However, some of Chomsky’s fears are based on misconceptions 
regarding R2P. While never explicitly stated, his use of the Corfu Channel case and his assertions 
that unilateral action is unacceptable reveal his fear that R2P would be used to justify unilateral 
action.116 However, Chomsky seems to assuage his own fear, asserting that R2P as agreed to in 
2005 “keeps the skeleton in the closet” and omits “the part that has been contested: the right to 
use force without Security Council authorization.”117 He even dismisses R2P as “add[ing] 
nothing substantially new” to international law.118 These concessions, however, do not stop 
Chomsky from attempting to use NATO’s campaign in Yugoslavia as the realization of unilateral 
action under R2P. This event, however, occurred before the term R2P had even been coined, 
making his criticism largely anachronistic.119 Additionally, the cases of Georgia and Burma 
explored in Chapter 2 show that states, even Permanent Five states, were unsuccessful in 
utilizing R2P as adopted in 2005 to justify their actions.
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 Since the principle’s adoption in 2005, the first pillar’s reconceptualization of sovereignty 
has sought to alter how states understand themselves and their relation with other states. By 
appropriating this foundational term in international relations, R2P presented itself as an already-
internalized concept that simply needed articulation. The first pillar employs all three of Wendt’s 
methods of state identity transformation, but these conceptual tools do not automatically redefine 
state identity. Cases of mass atrocities since 2005 have shown that R2P has yet to establish itself 
as a consistently applied principle of international law. However, the consensus that 
‘intervention’ under R2P can only be conducted multilaterally and through the Security Council 
seems to be the most internalized aspect of R2P, which should assuage fears that R2P is 
imperialism under a different name. States who seek such policies will not be given 
legitimization under R2P. In the years since the World Summit, R2P has continued to be 
discussed, debated, and developed. It is to this continued discourse on R2P that this paper now 
turns.
Reaffirming and Renegotiating R2P
 Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report marked the first in a series of annual Secretary-General 
reports, each of which explore a specific aspect of R2P that is either contentious or in need of 
further development.120 Ban Ki-moon’s steadfast effort to keep states talking about R2P is 
responsible to some degree for the continued engagement of the international and academic 
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community with the principle.121 It is odd then, given his determination to sustain active 
discourse on R2P, that he would assert, “The task ahead is not to reinterpret or renegotiate the 
conclusions of the World Summit but to find ways of implementing its decisions in a fully 
faithful and consistent manner.”122 There is no dispute that inconsistent implementation remains 
one of the most serious problems facing R2P today. However, to treat R2P as a static concept is 
to do injustice to the decades of debates and advocacy efforts that produced the very concept of 
R2P. Even if it is considered a ‘principle’ of international law, R2P is still fundamentally a 
concept, one which seeks to alter how states conceive their own identity and interests. As these 
identities and interests evolve, R2P will naturally evolve as well, a cyclical process explicated 
well by Wendt.
 Wendt asserts that, “It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organize 
our actions.”123 If R2P is successful and comes to structure the way that states conduct their 
domestic and foreign affairs, then the principle will have necessarily changed the way in which 
the international community understands the principle today, since it will have evolved from an 
emerging norm to an internalized characteristic of state behavior. The act of changing from an 
‘emerging norm’ to ‘internalized characteristic’ is itself a reinterpretation of the principle. Indeed, 
the first pillar of R2P is dependent on states interpreting its mandates into domestic law and 
negotiating between their present understanding of ‘self’ and sovereignty and those proposed by 
R2P. As Ban Ki-moon himself states, “if principles relating to the responsibility to protect are to 
take full effect and be sustainable, they must be integrated into each culture and society without 
! Muscott 38
121 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, 32.
122 UN General Assembly, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, para. 2.
123 Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” 418.
hesitation or condition, as a reflection of not only global but also local values and standards.”124 
What Ban Ki-moon is arguing for is the vernacularization of R2P, the reinterpretation of R2P into 
local and specific contexts. Therefore, if the first pillar of R2P is to be internalized as envisioned 
by the Secretary-General, R2P must constantly be open to reinterpretation and renegotiation.
 The divergent paths this process of interpretation can take is evidenced in the work of 
Bellamy and Evans, two of R2P’s greatest advocates. Although both operate off of the 2005 
consensus on R2P, the two have very different visions of what R2P is and should become. Evans, 
a co-chair of the ICISS which first coined the term ‘responsibility to protect’, still draws heavily 
from this commission’s report and the crises that animated its formation. Despite his repeated 
assertions that prevention is the primary goal of R2P, his understanding of the principle’s role 
belies his true vision for R2P. For Evans, R2P serves “as a mobilizer of instinctive, universal 
action in cases of conscience-shocking killing, ethnic cleansing, and other such crimes against 
humanity.”.125 Hence, R2P’s principal utility is as a catalyst for international action when these 
crimes are occurring, not a gradual reformation of state identity and interests. This contrasts 
starkly with Bellamy’s proposed vision of R2P. Bellamy asserts that, “RtoP is best seen as an 
agreed principle that generates policy agenda in need of implementation, that by itself it is 
unlikely to act as a catalyst for timely and decisive action in response to mass atrocities.”126 
Understood this way, R2P is a “universal and enduring commitment,” not a situational clarion 
call as Evans envisions it.127 Although both draw from the same World Summit Outcome 
Document as Ban Ki-moon, these advocates present divergent interpretations of the primary 
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objectives and potential of R2P, demonstrating that discussion and debate on R2P is far from 
over.
 This process of reinterpretation and renegotiation is not limited to the world of academia. 
Following the events in Libya, certain UN member states began to reconsider the concept of 
R2P as it was emerging in practice. In September of 2011 Brazil introduced what it termed 
“Responsibility while Protecting”, or RwP. This initiative adopts the three pillar framework for 
R2P but seeks to severely curtail the use of third pillar action, especially military intervention.128 
While this paper will reserve further discussion of this new concept of RwP for later chapters, it 
is mentioned here to demonstrate that R2P, just like states, is a product of practice, and hence 
subject to the same changes in identity and interests that it seeks to foster in states.
Conclusion
 In examining the first pillar, it is clear that constructivist ideas regarding identity and 
interest are fundamental to the principal goal of R2P, this being to change state behavior. The 
first pillar of R2P seeks to alter state behavior by redefining what it means to be a modern 
sovereign state. By associating itself with the principle of sovereignty, R2P advocates seek to 
facilitate the internalization of responsible governance as an inseparable component of statehood. 
The consensus on this new norm of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was not accidental but the 
product of deliberate efforts by R2P’s norm entrepreneurs to change how states perceive 
themselves and their relationship with other states. Wendt provides invaluable insight into how 
state identities are formed through practice and how they can subsequently be transformed, 
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insight which only constructivism can provide. In calling on states to reinterpret their identities 
and interests, R2P must remain open to this same reinterpretation as it too is the product of 
practice.
 While it is difficult to argue against the idea that sovereigns should protect populations 
from mass atrocity crimes, it is much harder to operationalize this responsibility. What happens 
when a state fails to realize its first pillar responsibilities under R2P? To answer this question, 
this paper turns to the second pillar of R2P, the “commitment of the international community to 
assist States” in meeting their first pillar obligations.129
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5. Supporting the Second Pillar: Liberal Institutionalism and Perpetual Peace through the 
Responsibility to Protect
 The previous chapter’s exploration of the first pillar and the dialogical and normative 
process that led to the development of R2P demonstrates that ideas do have their place in the 
study of international relations. While constructivism shows that identity and interests are 
dynamic and open to reconceptualization, it does not present a clear way of transforming this 
rhetoric into reality. All too familiar with the gap between state ‘commitments’ and state action, 
the drafters of R2P formulated what would become the second and third pillars of R2P. The 
second pillar, the responsibility of the international community to provide assistance and aid in 
capacity-building, is intended to assist those states who, though not actively perpetrating mass 
atrocities, are struggling to uphold their first pillar responsibilities. This call for international 
cooperation under R2P reflects the liberal belief that international institutions can foster 
cooperation and through this process change state behavior. The second pillar, then, lends itself 
well to a liberal analysis. 
 This chapter will employ the writings of theorists Keohane and Kant to examine the 
similarities between their aspirations for state relations and the aspirations of the second pillar of 
R2P. This examination will involve an exploration of Ban Ki-moon’s second pillar 
recommendations, as well as proposals by Bellamy and Evans.  While the second pillar seeks to 
foster a collective responsibility for the security of all populations, Chandler argues that R2P in 
reality reflects a divestment of Western responsibility in the issues facing the developing world, a 
critique which deserves examination. Finally, this chapter will close with an exploration of two 
cases which have come to exemplify the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of R2P: the post-election 
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violence in Kenya from 2007-8 and the crisis in Darfur from 2003 to the present day. This 
chapter will conclude that the second pillar, while better addressing the root causes of mass 
atrocities and offering the greatest potential in helping states internalize and realize their first 
pillar responsibilities, remains severely underdeveloped, both conceptually and in practice. This 
underdevelopment underscores the need to rebalance the three pillars. 
Liberal Institutionalism and R2P
 In his work, Keohane argues that international institutions have become a dominant and 
necessary feature of modern day global politics. States have increasingly come to rely on 
institutions to deal with pressing or persistent problems in international relations.130 Keohane 
argues that this is because, “Institutions create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually 
beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and enforcing agreements.”131 The UN certainly  
fits within this understanding of institutions; by facilitating and providing the space and impetus 
for states to negotiate pressing world issues, the UN reduces the costs of reaching agreements 
among member states. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that a principle like R2P could have emerged 
and been unanimously adopted by world leaders had it not been through the UN. Keohane 
further asserts that, “The procedures and rules of international institutions … determine what 
principles are acceptable as the basis for reducing conflicts and whether governmental actions 
are legitimate or illegitimate. Consequently, they help shape actors’ expectations.”132 R2P is a 
reflection of this process; through the UN, states found that R2P was an acceptable principle for 
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reducing conflict and determining legitimate and illegitimate behavior. To understand R2P, 
therefore, one must see R2P as a product of this institutional framework, with all its possibilities 
and pitfalls.
 While the UN has been successful in developing agreements and principles like R2P, 
enforcement has proven much more difficult to achieve. Despite its many bureaus and offices, 
the UN has largely depended on its member states to self-report and regulate regarding the 
obligations signed onto in these agreements. R2P is no exception. Regarding the second pillar 
specifically, no punishment or sanctions compel states to assist at-risk states. Because of this, the 
second pillar has a very low compliance pull.133 Given this reality, it is easy to see why the 
second pillar remains underutilized and underdeveloped. Without direct incentives to do so, the 
international community has not developed an adequate policy ‘toolbox’ to engage with its 
second pillar responsibilities. However, as Ban Ki-moon states, “Too often ignored by pundits 
and policymakers alike, pillar two is critical to forging a policy, procedure and practice that can 
be consistently applied and widely supported.”134 Given the critical role that the second pillar has 
in preventing atrocities and maintaining consensus around the principle, it is vital that this pillar 
be more seriously developed than it has to date. The Secretary-General in his 2009 report 
explored possible ways in which this pillar could be further developed and strengthened. His 
recommendations demonstrate a strong commitment to liberal institutionalist beliefs in the 
centrality of institutions in fostering dialogue and cooperation.
 The second pillar of R2P is derived from paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome 
which states that “we [Member States] … intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
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appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under 
stress before crises and conflicts break out.” Put another way, the second pillar is concerned with 
preventing mass atrocities before they occur and the role that the international community has in 
achieving this. In his 2009 report, Ban Ki-moon contends that this role could be fulfilled in four 
ways: (a) encouraging States to meet their responsibilities under pillar one; (b) helping them to 
exercise this responsibility; (c) helping them to build their capacity to protect; and (d) assisting 
States ‘under stress before crises and conflicts break out’.135 The latter three, Ban Ki-moon 
claims, “suggest mutual commitment and an active partnership between the international 
community and the State.”136 It is exactly such partnerships that liberal institutionalism seeks to 
cultivate and promote. 
 Ban Ki-moon stipulates that the second pillar, while crucial to R2P, is only applicable in a 
particular political environment. When a state is actively perpetrating mass atrocity crimes 
against its population, action under the second pillar would have little effect and could ultimately 
delay a timely and decisive response. While meant to combat the indecisiveness that had gripped 
the UN during the crises of the 1990s, the ability to immediately jump to more coercive action 
without exhausting peaceful measures first could lead to rash military action, as will be explored 
in the next chapter. However, “when national political leadership is weak, divided or uncertain 
about how to proceed, lacks the capacity to protect its population effectively, or faces an armed 
opposition that is threatening or committing crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to 
protect, measures under pillar two could play a critical role in the international implementation 
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[of R2P].”137 The second pillar, therefore, is about developing cooperative and constructive 
relationships with states who struggle but desire to uphold their first pillar responsibilities.
 Ban Ki-moon believes that the UN has a critical role to play in fostering the development 
of these relationships. The offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
the High Commissioner for Refugees, and UN special advisers among others are declared by 
Ban Ki-moon as having a special role to play in facilitating the implementation of the second 
pillar.138 These offices and advisers can institute “dialogue, education, and training on human 
rights and humanitarian standards and norms.”139 The Secretary-General points to the Office of 
the High Commissioner on Human Rights specifically, whose work seeks to alleviate social 
tensions and promote conflict prevention in nearly fifty countries.140 A UN presence in countries 
such as northern Uganda and Sudan has helped protect children from harm and recruitment into 
violent conflict.141 The UN, then, is not only the site of developing agreements on acceptable 
behavior, but a vital part of their realization.
 In addition to this dialogical and protective role, the Secretary-General asserts that the 
UN has a vital role to play in early warning and assessment. As Ban Ki-moon asserts in his 2010 
report, “The implementation of preventive measures ‘before crises and conflicts break out’ and 
the identification of which States ‘are under stress’ necessarily entail timely early warning and 
impartial assessment by the United Nations.”142 This need for accurate information is not limited 
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to the second pillar, but if gathered and acted upon in a timely manner this information could 
help ensure that the international community does not have to resort to third pillar action. 
“Indeed,” The Secretary-General states, “information, assessment, and early warning have 
become common functions and widely accepted tools in global (and regional) efforts to facilitate 
preventive action and multilateral cooperation.”143 However, this capacity for information 
gathering and dissemination has been hindered by states’ fear of making potentially sensitive 
information available in a global forum such as the UN.144 This fear reflects a universal obstacle 
to cooperation through institutions: fear of cheating and being ‘suckered’ by other states. 
 Bellamy explores this dilemma in hopes of discovering ways in which early warning and 
assessment can be strengthened. A key issue is interpretation: when are risks just ‘risks’ and 
when do they signal the imminent perpetration of mass atrocities?145 Little is offered in the way 
of resolving this issue, other than the institutionalization of information-gathering in a joint 
office for Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect.146 Ultimately, Bellamy concludes that, as 
consensus around R2P solidifies and information becomes increasingly accessible through open 
sources to non-state actors and governments alike, states will ease their hesitancy to share 
information and support the information-gathering capabilities of the UN.147
 In concluding his explication of the second pillar, the Secretary-General outlines five 
capacities which have been identified by member states as critical to the successful 
implementation of pillar one responsibilities and hence in need of support through pillar two 
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assistance. Each of these capacities – conflict-sensitive development analysis, indigenous 
mediation capacity, consensus and dialogue, local dispute resolution capacity, and the capacity to 
replicate capacity – all revolve around the ability to conduct and maintain constructive dialogue 
to mitigate societal tensions. While these capacities address the domestic sphere, their objectives 
reflect those that liberal institutionalism seeks to realize on a global scale: to mitigate tensions 
within international relations through constructive dialogue and cooperation between states. 
Liberal institutionalism, then, underpins not only R2P’s development and implementation, but 
also the form of its policy recommendations.
 Despite the central role the UN plays in realizing R2P’s mandate, R2P cannot be 
implemented by the UN alone. The 2009 report asserts that, “the public diplomacy of the 
Secretary-General has not been matched by the willingness of Member States … to give concrete 
shape to either his promises or his warnings.”148 Unless member states take their obligations 
under the second pillar of R2P seriously, the diplomatic efforts of the UN will fall flat and 
undermine the credibility of both the UN and R2P. Bellamy and Evans share this concern, and in 
response seek to develop effective policy that states can employ to uphold the second pillar and 
R2P itself.
A ‘Perpetual Peace’ through Liberal Policies
 Stemming from his ‘long-term policy agenda’ approach to R2P, Bellamy is primarily 
concerned with addressing the societal and structural issues that often precipitate instability and 
the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes. After conducting an exploration of episodes of mass 
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killing since 1945 and the political and economic situations that underlaid them, Bellamy argues 
that “the principal precondition for civil wars, in which the majority of mass atrocities are 
committed, is a country’s national income and that the principal precondition for atrocities 
committed outside the context of war is authoritarian government.”149 This argument leads 
Bellamy to conclude that economic development and democratization are two of the most 
important policies that the international community can pursue to prevent mass atrocities. Evans 
shares this commitment to encouraging good governance and economic development, asserting 
that representative and responsive governance “is at the heart of effective long-term conflict and 
mass atrocity prevention” and that “Economic development matters.”150 Ban Ki-moon also 
comes out in favor of such policies, arguing that, “Expanding development assistance … would 
undoubtedly have a net positive effect on preventing crimes and violations relating to the 
responsibility to protect if such assistance … increases [the poor and minority groups’] 
opportunities for meaningful political participation.”151
 The belief that economic interdependence and representative government can lead to 
peace is one of liberalism’s most classic arguments. Kant is often considered the father of this 
theory and hence his work provides the foundation for much of the propositions for second pillar 
action offered by R2P advocates. Kant contends that a republican government, which he defines 
as representative with separation between executive and legislative bodies, is the only form of 
governance that can pull men out of a state of war. This is because citizens, who bear the burdens 
of war, are unlikely to consent to conflict, consent which is needed in a republican 
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government.152 The foundations of the economic development argument are also evident in 
Kant’s work. Kant holds that:
 Because of all the forces under the control of the power of the state the power of money 
is the most indispensable, states see themselves compelled, of course not by motives of 
morality, to further the maintenance of peace, and, wherever in the world war threatens to 
break out, to prevent it by mediation, just as if they were in a permanent league with each 
other for this purpose.153
If Kant’s assertion is true, then not only does a stronger domestic economy predispose states 
against conflict and war, but economic considerations form the very basis on which states seek to 
enter into cooperation with each other. Therefore, effective economic development would be the 
surest way of preventing mass atrocities and continuing cooperation through international 
institutions.
 Indeed, Kant sees such a ‘league’ or ‘federation’ as the only civil course for states to take. 
“We now look with deep disdain on the attachment of savages to their lawless freedom, their 
preference to be engaged in incessant strife rather than submit themselves to a self-imposed 
restraint of law, their preference of wild freedom to rational freedom.” This disdain for ‘wild 
freedom’ is shared by Evans, who laments the lingering view that sovereignty is an unequivocal 
right to non-intervention and non-interference.154 Evans seeks to transform this non-interference 
into non-indifference by offering specific ‘tools’ states can utilize to fulfill their second pillar 
responsibilities. He divides his recommendations into four categories: political/diplomatic 
measures, economic/social measures, constitutional/legal measures, and security sector 
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measures.155 Each of these categories are in turn divided into long- and short-term policies that 
can be taken to address structural or immediate factors that could lead to mass atrocities. 
 Many of his long-term policies are supportive in nature and reflect the general aspirations 
of both liberalism and institutionalism, aspirations such as promoting good governance, 
promoting membership in international organizations, supporting economic development, 
promoting the rule of law, and promoting fair constitutional structures.156 Many of the short-term 
actions, however, are punitive in nature and revolve around threats of political and economic 
sanctions, international criminal prosecution, arms embargoes, or ending military cooperation 
programs.157 Many of these long- and short-term recommendations are not new to the world of 
foreign policy;  many states have already made at least rhetorical commitments to implement or 
utilize these measures.158 
 While devoting considerable time to exploring these widely recognized measures, Evans 
also offers some policy tools that are quite innovative. Listed as part of his longer-term economic 
and social strategies, Evans explores an emerging concept called ‘education for tolerance’. 
Realizing that ethnic division and hatred can begin and be taught at a young age, advocates of 
this concept call for formal education programs that “cut across ethnocentric divides and 
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hostile or suspicious groups.”159 Additionally, Evans recommends community peace-building 
programs as a way of empowering local communities to overcome their societal divisions. Seeds 
for Peace, a program which brings Arab and Israeli youth together to interact and foster 
relationships, offers a promising example of the possibilities for such programs.160 Closing with 
a more direct policy tool, Evans also suggests that economic incentives be implemented in 
addition to, or in place of, sanctions. Evans recognizes such a recommendation is controversial: 
“critical domestic audiences … prefer to bludgeon perceived bad guys into submission than 
reward their actual or potential wrongdoing with taxpayer-funded handouts”.161 However, as he 
points out, “incentives have the great attraction for policymakers that they actually tend to 
work”.162 One need only look at the psychological effects sanctions produce – hostility, fear, 
resistance – to see why incentives, which convey a sense of goodwill and cooperation, provide a 
more fruitful avenue for second pillar engagement.163 Such positive engagement stands a much 
higher chance of realizing Kant’s vision of “intelligent association and friendly relationship” 
between states than actions which seek to threaten and intimidate states into compliance.164
 A common thread among these policy recommendations and the second pillar more 
generally is an emphasis on helping faltering states ‘help themselves’.165 While advocates of 
R2P see this as an affirmation of the principal position of the state in its own internal affairs, 
critics have interpreted this push for individual state responsibility rather differently. Chandler 
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argues that the principle of R2P reflects a “broader context of international disengagement and 
the desire to shift political responsibility away from leading Western states.”166 Read this way, 
the deficit of serious pillar two implementation is not due to a lack of policy ‘tools’, but rather a 
lack of political will within the international community to engage with often ‘third world’ 
problems. 
 At first glance, this assessment appears devastating for R2P. If the principle represents 
nothing more than a symbol of Western disengagement from global conflicts and crises, R2P 
would be its own antithesis. However, after a full exploration of Chandler’s argument, one finds 
that Chandler’s evidence points less towards R2P being a divestment of Western responsibility 
than a reconceptualization of this responsibility. This is clearly evidenced in the following quote:
Where ‘humanitarian intervention’ put the emphasis on leading Western states overtly 
intervening to take responsibility for stopping mass atrocities, the new-look R2P argues 
that Western responsibility is much more limited. Essentially the role for Western powers 
is an indirect one, providing support to the ‘weak’ and ‘failing’ state in enhancing its 
‘sovereignty’. Rather than the R2P being a coda for direct humanitarian intervention it 
has become the key normative justification for the more indirect forms of intervention 
associated with international statebuilding.167
It is hard to see why Chandler so strongly condemns this re-envisioning of Western 
responsibility. Would Chandler prefer for the West to return to a policy of wanton unilateral 
military intervention? It would seem so, given his criticism of Western states for funding and 
training the African Union’s African Standby Force for peacekeeping missions rather than 
conducting these missions themselves. This paper sees this criticism as fundamentally odd. 
Given the West’s ugly history of colonialism and military engagement abroad, one would think 
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that empowering regional and local actors to address regional and local conflicts would be much 
preferable to Western military intervention. Rather than seeing the ‘indirect’ methods condemned 
by Chandler as a divestment of responsibility, this paper views this new form of Western 
engagement, embodied by the second pillar, as a responsible way for Western states to engage in 
preventive foreign policy. 
 Throughout the rest of his essay Chandler continues to be critical of this “liberal 
institutional approach” which advocates that building the capacity of a state’s component 
institutions will help prevent mass atrocities.168 Chandler rejects the notion that failing state 
institutions are to blame for the perpetration of mass atrocities, or at least that external attempts 
at reviving these institutions will succeed.169 Chandler, quick to criticize, is loath to offer 
alternative solutions. While this paper recognizes that the second pillar does not directly offer 
ways of resolving global inequalities, this paper holds that the second pillar at least attempts to 
address these issues by encouraging economic development and cooperation at the institutional 
and state-to-state level.
 While the second pillar provides the most direct and constructive way to prevent mass 
atrocities, its inconsistent implementation undermines its potential. This paper now turns to an 
exploration of two case studies, Darfur and Kenya. These two cases, often considered the ‘best’ 





The ‘Success’ and ‘Failure’ of R2P 
 The crisis in Darfur and the post-electoral violence in Kenya were chosen because each 
offers insight into the importance of second pillar action in addressing the root causes of conflict 
and the role that the UN can play in effective diplomacy. Additionally, these two cases are often 
heralded as the prime examples of the success or failure of R2P. Although both of these examples 
involve African states, the selection of these cases is not mean to perpetuate the belief that R2P’s 
implementation is limited to this region. Rather, these cases have been selected because they 
reveal where R2P has done well, and where R2P can do better. This section begins with an 
examination of Darfur and concludes with Kenya, following each situation to the present day.
Darfur
 The Darfur region, which has existed in a state of tension with the Sudanese state since its 
incorporation at the beginning of the 20th century, was plunged into crisis in 2003 when uprisings 
by non-Arab Sudanese in Darfur were met with brutal violence by state-backed janjaweed 
militias. In Bellamy’s account, the janjaweed militias led a “campaign of mass killing and 
displacement that left around 250,000 people dead and over 2 million displaced.”170 Despite 
warning signs – years of drought, inflamed regional tensions, an influx of weapons, and sporadic 
conflicts between farmers and nomadic tribes – the international community ultimately did little 
to try and prevent the coming atrocities.171 Numerous rebel groups formed shortly after the 
outbreak of violence and plunged the region into chaos. When R2P was adopted two years later, 
lawmakers attempted to invoke R2P in relation to the situation in Darfur but received little 
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response.172 A peace process negotiated in Doha, Qatar was finally agreed to in May of 2011. 
The Sudanese Government and the Liberty and Justice Movement, a coalition of eleven rebels 
groups patched together by international mediators to save the negotiation process, officially 
signed onto the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur on 14 July 2011.173 Meetings are still 
underway to negotiate the implementation of the Doha peace agreement, the most recent taking 
place on 9 April 2013.174 Despite the progress being made, rebel groups are still active and 
making their rejection of the Doha agreement known, blowing up an evacuated train just four 
days prior to the 9 April meeting.175
 The UN attempted to address the situation in Darfur throughout the crisis. These included 
Security Council resolutions condemning Sudan’s actions, establishing a UN Mission in Sudan 
(UNMIS), imposing sanctions, and referring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC).176 The latter not only marked the first Security Council referral to the ICC, it also 
led to the eventual indictment of President Omar al-Bashir, the first ever ICC indictment of a 
sitting president.177 Marking yet another first, Security Council 1706 (2006) was the first time 
that the Security Council had used R2P language in reference to a specific situation.178 The 
African Union also expended considerable time and resources to the crisis, establishing a African 
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Union Mission in Sudan in 2006.179 Despite these resolutions and efforts by the UN, the Security 
Council, and regional organizations alike, the general assessment of the situation in Darfur has 
been that “Darfur represents RtoP’s primary test case, a test which the principle is generally 
reckoned to have failed.”180 
 While some are quick to point toward the ethnic qualities of the Darfur crisis, Noah 
Bassil holds that “the fundamental cause of the conflict has been a struggle over diminishing 
natural resources.”181 Attempts to Reduce the conflict in Darfur to Arab/non-Arab or nomadic/
sedentary binaries ignore the root causes that led to the politicization of these identities. As 
Bassil asserts, “any effort to present a lasting resolution to conflict necessitates an uncovering of 
the initial causes of the dispute between the differing groups.”182 Bassil argues that it is Darfur’s 
severe underdevelopment that has left the Sudanese government unable to meet the people of 
Darfur’s demand for state resources following years of drought and environmental degradation, 
which in turn has polarized relations between the region and the state.183 This analysis lends 
credence to Bellamy’s argument that economic development is key to preventing and ending 
mass atrocities. Bellamy directly discusses the role that resource scarcity had in Darfur, asserting 
that, “The role that the increasing scarcity of water and grazing land, both necessary for survival 
in Darfur, played in sharpening the conflict there is a case in point [of the importance of relative 
standing in a context of scarcity].184 The Darfur case demonstrates the importance of the second 
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pillar in preventing mass atrocities. If the international community had taken the severe resource 
situation in Darfur seriously as it was unfolding, it may have been possible to mitigate the 
tensions that arose and ultimately consumed the region.
 While not directly a second pillar measure, it is worth examining the effect the ICC had 
in Darfur. Although marking a turning point for both R2P and the ICC, the results of this 
investigation and indictment should give advocates of ICC action within an R2P framework 
pause. Following his indictment, al-Bashir expelled thirteen humanitarian aid groups which he 
accused of conspiring with the ICC from Sudan.185 As a New York Times article reported, “The 
expulsion of organizations that provide clean water, medical treatment, food and shelter for 
millions of Sudanese in the war-racked region of Darfur has thrown the world’s largest aid 
operation into disarray, putting the lives of millions of displaced people at risk.”186 Others have 
expressed concern that the indictment only increased the risk of greater violence in the region 
and could further undermine the ICC’s image within Sudan.187 President al-Bashir’s indictment, 
which put countless populations at greater risk, seems to have undermined R2P’s objective of 
protecting populations from mass atrocities. Given this, should the ICC still have a place within 
R2P?
 Evans discusses this dilemma at length, calling it the ‘peace versus justice problem’: 
should the demands of justice – to bring an end once and for all to the almost universal 
impunity that has prevailed in relation to these crimes in the past, and to create an 
effective deterrent to their commission in the future – ever yield, in the case of a clash 
between them, to the demands of peace, namely to bring an end to some conflict that has 
! Muscott 58
185 Lynsey Addario and Lydia Polgreen, “Aid Groups’ Expulsion, Fears of More Misery,” New York Times, 22 March 
22 2009, accessed 28 April 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/world/africa/23darfur.html?_r=0. 
186 Ibid.
187 “ICC vs. Sudan: The Complexities Behind the al-Bashir Case,” Spiegel Online, 05 March 2009, accessed 28 
April 28 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/icc-vs-sudan-the-complexities-behind-the-al-bashir-case-
a-611614.html.
wreaked untold destruction and misery until then and which may continue to do so if a 
peace agreement cannot be reached?188
Evans notes that this dilemma is most present when conflict is ongoing and peace agreements are 
in the balance, a circumstance which accurately described the situation in Darfur at the time of 
the ICC’s indictment.189 The ICC is an incredible innovation that can potentially be developed 
into an effective tool to deter individuals from and hold individuals accountable for the 
perpetration of mass atrocity crimes,. However, its use must be balanced by a real-world 
calculation of the potential costs such a course of action may bear, since they will most likely be 
born by those already suffering.
 Evans’s summary of the situation in Darfur captures quite well the dilemma of attempting 
to use coercive solutions to this problem:
The inability here to use coercive military measures does not mean that this is a case of 
‘R2P failure; it just means that the international response to the Sudan government’s ill-
will or incapacity has to take other forms, including the application of sustained 
diplomatic, economic, and legal pressure to change the cost-benefit balance of the 
regime’s calculations.190
This paper arrives at the same conclusion. The inability of troop deployment and other coercive 
means to protect populations from further harm demonstrates that the second pillar must be 
strengthened and faithfully implemented before a situation has reached the level of a crisis. The 
roots of this conflict in environmental degradation and resource scarcity point toward the need 
for long-term engagement in economic development and capacity-building so that the Sudanese 
state can effectively respond to the growing demands of its populations in the face of dwindling 
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resources. While this is not meant to completely dismiss coercive action, such action must take 
into account the possible consequences both for long-term solutions and short-term suffering. 
Kenya
 Unlike the slow international response seen in Darfur, the 2007-08 crisis in Kenya 
witnessed rapid mobilization both within the UN and regional bodies. With sporadic violence 
already breaking out prior to the election, the crisis officially began when sitting president Mwai 
Kibaki was declared the winner of Kenya’s December 2007 presidential elections. Supporters of 
opposition candidate Raila Odinga declared that the elections had been rigged, sparking violence 
that plunged the country into crisis.191 Up to 1,000 people were killed and 300,000 displaced 
following the contested election, but by February of 2008 a mediation team headed by former 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan and composed of African Union officials had begun negotiations 
between the two factions.192 The negotiations took place from 6-28 of February, concluding with 
a power sharing agreement between Kibaki who would serve as president and Odinga who 
would serve as Prime Minister with a coalition government consisting of 40 cabinet members 
and 50 assistant ministers.193 The repeated referrals to R2P by both former and current Secretary-
Generals Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon has led the Kenyan case to be considered one of the 
defining cases of R2P.194
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 The relatively rapid resolution of this conflict through mediation has led the case to be 
“widely trumpeted as the best example of RtoP in practice.”195 Evans articulates Kenya’s 
significance this way: “Kenya in early 2008 is the best recent example of the early, and effective, 
mobilization of political and diplomatic resources to bring back under control an explosive mass 
atrocity situation […] that could have quickly become, without this intervention, very much 
more catastrophic in scale.”196 What is most telling about this ‘best example’ is what this 
intervention did not involve. There were no sanctions, no troops, no referrals to the ICC prior to 
the successful completion of negotiations. Instead, diplomatic action framed within a R2P 
framework was quickly mobilized to engage Kenya’s political leaders to arrive at a peaceful 
resolution. 
 While this case should be considered a success in implementing R2P’s second pillar, 
suffering and displacement did still occur. This violence demonstrates the weaknesses of Kenya’s 
electoral institutions and the rule of law, witnessed by the ability of political agents to create such 
instability and devastation in such a short amount of time. While its institutions were weak, 
Kenya was still a democracy, a fact which seems to weaken the liberal assertion that democracy 
leads to less violence. However, as discussed briefly in chapter 3, this trend only tends to hold 
for mature democracies. While a strong correlation has been found between democratic 
institutions and the absence of mass atrocities, highly factionalized partial democracies have 
proven to be incredibly volatile.197 Bellamy asserts that the first five to ten years are critical for 
establishing a stable and legitimate democracy, and hence the international community should 
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spend particular effort in defending budding democracies from unrest, a goal which would fit 
within a pillar two framework.198 Ironically, Kenya’s next presidential elections were held almost 
exactly five years after its highly factionalized 2007 presidential elections and subsequent 
atrocities. It is all too appropriate, then, for this paper to reexamine this ‘best example’ in the 
wake of these most recent presidential elections to see if Kenya’s democracy had strengthened 
since it was last upheaved. But first, a brief exploration of the events between 2008 and the 4 
March 2013 elections is needed.
 As part of the 2008 power sharing agreement, the Kenyan government was charged with 
establishing a commission of inquiry to investigate the post-election violence. This investigation 
led to the recommendation that a special tribunal be established to try those believed to be 
responsible for instigating and perpetrating the violence, a recommendation which was shot 
down by Kenya’s National Assembly.199 The refusal of the Kenyan government to establish these 
tribunals led ICC prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo to initiate his own investigation which 
resulted in the indictment of several individuals including Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru 
Kenyatta, a candidate in the 2013 presidential elections. The ICC found that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that Kenyatta was responsible as an indirect perpetrator of five 
counts of crimes against humanity.200 Despite this indictment and pending trial, Kenyatta won 
! Muscott 62
198 Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect, 116.
199 “Kenyan MPs reject violence court,” BBC, 12 February 2009, accessed 28 April 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7886395.stm. 
200 “ICC-01/09-02/11: The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,” International Criminal Court, accessed 28 April  
2013, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/related
%20cases/icc01090211/Pages/icc01090111.aspx. 
the election, his victory becoming official with the Kenyan supreme court’s decision to uphold 
that the election was free and fair and Odinga’s concession shortly thereafter.201 
 The pre-election period was filled with tension just as in 2007. Analysts feared that a 
disputed election could lead to the same violence witnessed in 2008, especially if either Kenyatta 
or Odinga refused to concede the election.202 However, peace has largely prevailed, with 
Kenyatta sworn in on 9 April 2013.203 What remains a point of contention, however, is the ICC’s 
refusal to drop Kenyatta’s indictment. Kenyatta’s lawyers have urged the ICC to drop their 
charges, or to at least reevaluate its case following the recanting of witness testimony.204 Some 
analysts have even gone so far as to argue that the ICC’s indictment of Kenyatta might have led 
Kenyans to rally behind him as a gesture against Western interference in Kenya’s politics.205 
Kenyatta, while maintaining his innocence, has vowed to cooperate with the Hague.206 
 This election bears symbolic importance beyond Bellamy’s five year assessment. 
Kenyatta and Odinga are the sons of Kenya’s first president and vice president, both of whom 
played a vital role in ending Britain’s colonial rule in the 1960s. In light of this symbolism, 
Kenya’s rejection of the West’s indictment of their president-elect again questions the role of the 
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ICC within R2P. The second pillar, engaged in Kenya through timely diplomacy and mediation, 
is meant to foster cooperation between states. The ICC, on the other hand, appears to be driving a 
wedge between states who experience mass atrocities and those who seek to assist. Again, 
although not part of the second pillar, the ICC’s role in Kenya as well as Darfur provide an 
opportunity to consider the utility of the ICC as part of an R2P framework.
Conclusions
 This chapter has explored how both classical liberalism and liberal institutionalism have 
influenced and shaped R2P, especially in terms of the policies proposed in the second pillar. The 
interconnectedness between theory and policy makes it impossible to understand the aspirations 
and intentions of the second pillar absent liberal international relations theory. The policies 
recommended by the second pillar mark a departure from the humanitarian interventionist nature 
of foreign engagement prior to R2P. While some interpret this as a divestment of responsibility 
by Western states, this paper contends that the second pillar is more accurately understood as a 
more responsible form of foreign policy, living up to the principles of cooperation and assistance 
embodied in R2P. The cases of Darfur and Kenya both show the importance of early second 
pillar engagement through economic development and state capacity-building. While these very 
visible cases provide an excellent opportunity to explore how the second pillar was or could have 
been implemented, it is important to note that pillar two is most successful when no intervention 
is necessary. As Evans’ asserts, “diplomacy to prevent the merely threatened initial outbreak of 
conflict or mass violence is most successful when nothing happens, and nobody notices.”207 
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From Burundi to Romania, R2P has helped mobilize diplomatic efforts that have never made the 
headlines.208 Successful cooperation does not make the news, and hence R2P’s greatest 
successes, for better or worse, will largely remain invisible. 
 This chapter has also briefly explored the role of the ICC in R2P. In the cases of Darfur 
and Kenya, recourse to the ICC appeared to result in the souring of foreign relations at best and 
the direct endangerment of populations at worst. Considered part of third pillar action, this 
exploration of the ICC serves as a useful transition to the third pillar and an examination of 




6. Rebalancing the Third Pillar: Realism and Reassessing the Use of Force After Libya
 The previous chapter’s exploration of the second pillar focused on theories and policies 
which are built off of cooperation and the belief that international assistance can help mitigate 
and prevent mass atrocities. However, as the historical record shows, such action has either been 
underutilized or has failed to prevent states from descending into chaos. Libya serves as a recent 
example of state repression escalating into violent conflict despite UN efforts to broker a 
peaceable solution. The UN’s most decisive action, the authorization of member states “to take 
all necessary measures” to protect civilians, resulted in a massive NATO bombing campaign, the 
ousting and murder of President Muammar Gaddafi, and an environment permissive to egregious 
human rights abuses by both rebel and government forces. Realists like Mearsheimer would 
contend that Libya provides a clear example that institutions are ultimately the pawns of 
powerful states. Mearsheimer’s analysis of institutions provides critical insight into the 
limitations inherent to the third pillar of R2P and the dangers of remaining mired in a military 
approach to mass atrocities. O’Connell’s argument regarding the incompatibility of military force 
with civilian protection further underscores the need to shift the surfeit attention, energy, and 
resources that have been spent on the third pillar toward effectively developing the other two 
pillars of R2P. Only when the three pillars of R2P are balanced will R2P be capable of fulfilling 
its mandate of protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes. 
 This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first will explore Ban Ki-moon’s 
vision of the third pillar, as well as recommendations put forth by Bellamy and Evans. 
Mearsheimer’s argument on institutions will be used to analyze these advocates’ arguments, 
shedding light on the difficulties states face in faithfully implementing third pillar 
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responsibilities. The next section will explore third pillar action taken in relation to the 2011 
crisis in Libya and evaluate how effective the third pillar’s implementation was in protecting 
populations.209 The final section will be examine O’Connell’s argument for a ‘responsibility to 
peace’ in relation to the Libyan case and how similar ideas such as Brazil’s RwP could 
potentially help rebalance the third pillar of R2P. This chapter will conclude that, while the 
potential for coercive force may be necessary to compel states to take their first pillar 
responsibilities seriously and incentivize cooperation through the second pillar, the third pillar 
cannot come to define R2P. If it does, the aspects of R2P that distinguish it from the tired 
principle of humanitarian intervention will disappear, consensus will be lost, and the 
international community will find itself in the same cycle of reaction which R2P’s framers 
sought to break. 
Responding to Insecurity
 In his 2009 report, the Secretary-General derives the third pillar of R2P – the 
responsibility to respond in a timely and decisive manner to mass atrocities – from paragraph 
139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, which asserts that, “we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate.”210 This collective action is conditional, dependent on 
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whether peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations.211 When these conditions are met, the international community has a 
responsibility to take action to protect these populations. While Ban Ki-moon asserts that the 
third pillar could include non-coercive measures such as mediation, the pillar’s true nature is best 
reflected when the Secretary-General asserts, “no strategy for fulfilling the responsibility to 
protect would be complete without the possibility of collective enforcement measures, including 
through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases.”212 Some of the more coercive 
measures covered under the third pillar of R2P include referral to the ICC, freezing financial 
assets, imposing travel bans, suspension of credit, and the use of force if authorized through the 
Security Council.213 This attempt to coordinate and sanction the use of force through the Security  
council reflects the desire to institutionalize cooperation regarding military action, a feat which 
Mearsheimer holds is nearly impossible for institutions to achieve.
 Mearsheimer contends that institutional cooperation is highly unlikely when it comes to 
the realm of security. While liberal institutionalism is capable of fostering economic cooperation, 
“the theory’s proponents pay little attention to the security realm, where questions about war and 
peace are of central importance.”214 Hence liberal institutionalism, while fitted for an exploration 
of the second pillar, is not well suited to handle or coordinate security issues. Mearsheimer 
argues that this is because when it comes to the sort of economic and diplomatic cooperation 
called for in the second pillar, cheating is much less likely to threaten the survival of the state. 
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This, however, is not the case when it comes to security. As Mearsheimer notes, “Given that ‘the 
costs of betrayal’ are potentially much graver in the military than the economic sphere, states will 
be very reluctant to accept the ‘one step backward, two steps forward’ logic which underpins the 
tit-for-tat strategy of conditional cooperation.”215 This reluctance is clearly evident when it 
comes to humanitarian intervention. The ‘Mogadishu effect’, a term used to describe the US’s 
continued reluctance to put troops on the ground for humanitarian purposes following the death 
of American soldiers in Somalia, is a testament to the lasting effect being ‘suckered’ can have on 
foreign policy.216 Given this reality, military action under R2P will most likely be “based on the 
self-interested calculations of the great powers” rather than humanitarian ideals.217
 Evans recognizes that military action under R2P is largely hostage to the political 
considerations of the Permanent Five Security Council members (US, Britain, France, China, and 
Russia). It is this recognition that leads him to so adamantly push for the development of criteria 
for military action which, if fulfilled, would compel the Security Council to take decisive 
action.218 Bellamy, however, rejects this call for criteria, arguing that, “criteria are very unlikely 
to produce consensus or manufacture political will in real cases.”219 Even if the ‘just war’ criteria 
set out by Evans were established, these would still provide little assurance that Permanent Five 
states would agree on whether crimes were occurring or if a certain ‘threshold’ had been met.220 
Mearsheimer would concur with Bellamy’s analysis. To ask the Security Council to adopt criteria 
is to ask powerful states to relinquish control over their foreign policy decisions. Given that 
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Mearsheimer views rules as reflections of “state calculations of self-interest”, the likelihood of 
Permanent Five states to agree to such criteria is minimal.221 Bellamy therefore sees little utility 
in expending precious political capital on trying to establish criteria for military action. 
 Bellamy, however, does have his own concerns when it comes to military intervention. 
Some critics of R2P assert that the possibility for military intervention under R2P motivates 
disenfranchised or rebels groups to pursue suicidal policies in order to draw the international 
community to intervene on their behalf.222 Therefore, these critics argue, R2P ultimately leads to 
the very crimes that the principle seeks to prevent. If this theory, which Bellamy calls ‘moral 
hazard theory’, is true, any sort of military capability within R2P would undermine the 
principle’s capacity to prevent atrocities. However, Bellamy demonstrates that, from the period 
1990-2008, rebellions against established governments have steadily decreased, which he argues 
undermines the moral hazard argument. Bellamy’s analysis, however, ends with the year 2008, 
only three years after R2P’s adoption and before the Arab Spring had taken hold of the Middle 
East. Given the importance of this event, this paper analyzed new conflict data for the 2008-11 
period to see if this downward trend still holds. 
 Using the same database as Bellamy (the Uppsala Conflict Data Program), I limited my 
query to internal armed conflicts from 2008-2011 between the government of a state and one or 
more internal opposition groups, conflicts which this paper will refer to as ‘rebellions’. In 
addition to this parameter, I included rebellions that also involved intervention from other states. 
I explored both minor and major rebellions, minor signifying 25-999 deaths per year and major 
signifying over 1,000 deaths per year. I examined all three sources of conflict covered in the 
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dataset, which are territory, government, and both territory and government. My findings were 
somewhat ambiguous. In Bellamy’s analysis, total rebellions dropped from 45 in 1990 to 26 in 
2008. My analysis found that, while total rebellions remained below 40, a general downward 
trend was interrupted by an uptick in rebellions in 2011. Given that the Arab Spring is widely 
acknowledged to have started in December of 2010 following protests in Tunisia, this increase in 
rebellions makes sense. It is difficult, however, to determine the motivations of the rebel 
movements that swept through the region. Did protesters take to the street with the expectation 
that the UN or other states would intervene on their behalf? Or were these protests simply the 
culmination of years of repression under autocratic regimes? If protesters did believe that foreign 
powers would come to their aid, their belief was sorely misplaced. Of the 118 rebellions that 
occurred within this four year period, only 19 saw the intervention of a foreign government. 
While rebellions have certainly declined since Bellamy’s initial measurement in 1990, the 
2008-11 period, and the Libyan case in particular, could potentially casts doubts on Bellamy’s 
outright rejection of moral hazard theory.






2008 2009 2010 2011
Major Rebellions ( >1,000 deaths/year) Minor Rebellions (25-999 deaths/year) All Rebellions
Data collected from: Themnér, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen, 2012. "Armed Conflict, 
1946-2011." Journal of Peace Research 49(4). Accessed via: http://www.pcr.uu.se/
research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/. 
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The Crisis in Libya
 Bellamy is not only interested in the motivations of possible rebels. While the 
perpetration of mass atrocities may seem so base as to have no foundation in reason, Bellamy 
asserts that, “political leaders select mass atrocities as a rational strategy for pursuing their 
objectives … When their back is against the wall, governments especially know that they are as 
likely to succeed as fail if they resort to mass atrocities – an attractive proposition if they think 
there are few viable alternatives.”223 The Gaddafi regime demonstrated such logic in 2011 when 
public protests quickly turned into full-out rebellion against the state. 
 In the years leading up to the 2011 civil war, Gaddafi’s Great Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya was far from the pariah that it had been during much of the twentieth century. In 
2003, the Gaddafi regime announced that it would cease to pursue weapons of mass destruction 
and would allow international inspectors into the country to dismantle its weapons program.224 
Many analysts saw this as a possible first step in Libya’s reintegration into the international 
community.225 While this increased accessibility and cooperation seemed to hint toward a 
reformed Libya, the state’s reforms were largely limited to its foreign policy. Populations within 
Libya, still haunted by the disappearances and liquidation of political dissidents during the 
1980s, continued to be subjected daily to human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention and 
torture.226 This led Amnesty International to report that:
The slow pace of domestic reform contrasts sharply with Libya’s increased visibility on 
the international scene and prompts fears that members of the EU and the USA, rather 
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than using the opportunity to encourage reforms, are turning a blind eye to the human 
rights situation in order to further their national interests, which include cooperation with 
counter-terrorism, the control of irregular migration, trade and other economic benefits.227 
This concern regarding the blind eye turned by the EU and the US toward Libya’s continued 
human rights violations seems to give evidence to Mearsheimer’s assertion that, “Each side cares 
about the other only to the extent that the other side’s behavior affects its own prospects for 
achieving maximum profits.”228 As long as the Libyan government continued to cooperate with 
US and EU national interests, these states were willing to leave Libya’s human rights abuses 
widely unchallenged. 
 All of this changed, however, when the longstanding regimes in Tunisia and Egypt 
toppled under the tide of popular dissent. Fearful that this tide may wash over Libya, the Libyan 
government began arresting prominent activists and writers in an attempt to curb a popular 
uprising before it started.229 These arrests did not preempt, but rather precipitated public 
demonstrations against the government, with protesters organizing a ‘Day of Rage’ on 17 
February 2011.230 State security forces attempted to disband peaceful demonstrators, but their 
excessive use of force only further fueled a movement already beginning to call for the end of 
the Gaddafi regime.231 Protests spread throughout the country in a matter of days. On 22 
February Gaddafi utilized his first public speech since the unrest to promise that he would “purge 
Libya inch by inch, room by room, household by household, alley by alley, and individual by 
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individual until the country is purified.”232 Libya, long plagued by political repression and severe 
economic inequality, had within the span of a week had descended into a mass atrocity situation.
 The Security Council for its part was quick to recognize the danger of the deteriorating 
situation in Libya and adopted resolution 1970 (2011) on the 26 February. In the resolution, the 
Security Council directly invoked “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its 
population,” placing the Libyan crisis within a R2P framework from the very first Security 
Council resolution.233 The Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference all quickly condemned the actions taking place in Libya, 
demonstrating that there was quick and universal recognition of the violations and crimes that 
were occurring.234 The resolution would go on to institute an arms embargo, travel ban, and asset 
freeze on certain Libyan authorities believed to be complicit with the perpetration of violence.235 
The Security Council should be commended for its quick adoption of such a hard-hitting 
resolution. While this resolution marks a political decisiveness not often seen within the Security 
Council, it also marks the beginning in a series of missteps which shattered the possibility of a 
peaceable solution in Libya from the outset.
 As explored in the previous chapter, ICC investigations have led to questionable results in 
terms of ensuring the immediate protection of populations from harm. Hence it is somewhat 
shocking that the Security Council in its very first resolution on Libya referred the situation to 
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the ICC, despite the fact that Libya is not a signatory to the Rome Statute.236 While the three 
sanctions listed above demonstrate timely and decisive response by the Security Council that 
could potentially check Libyan authorities, an ICC referral prior to any mediation or peace 
process immediately closes the door on any possibility for negotiations. While sanctions can be 
lifted once behavior is corrected, indictments cannot, at least without undermining the Court. 
Knowing that he would likely face indictment and a criminal tribunal if he were to relinquish his 
power, this referral put Libya on a path to a scorched-earth policy described by Bellamy at the 
beginning of this section.
 Shortly after this resolution was adopted, government officials began defecting to the 
opposition in significant numbers.237 On 2 March, opposition forces announced the formation of 
the National Transitional Council (NTC), headed by former Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil 
who had defected shortly after the protests began. This opposition group claimed that they, not 
the state, were the legitimate representatives of the Libyan people. On 6 March, Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon appointed former Foreign Minister of Jordan Abdul Khatib as his Special 
Envoy to Libya.238 On 17 March, the Security Council passed its second resolution relating to the 
conflict in Libya. This resolution again utilized a responsibility to protect framework, asserting 
“the responsibility of Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population”.239 Adopted only 11 
days after Khatib was appointed to broker negotiations between the warring parties, the 
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resolution instituted a no-fly zone and authorized member states “acting nationally or through 
regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to 
take all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack”.240 Interpreted as the authorization of the use of force, Libya marks the first time that 
R2P has been utilized through the UN to sanction the use of force against a non-consenting state. 
 This whirlwind of events – the formation of the NTC, appointment of a Special Envoy, 
and sanctioning the use of force, all within fifteen days – demonstrate that little time was given 
to explore, develop, or implement more peaceful measures. The days between the appointment of 
a UN mediator and the call for force offered little opportunity for meaningful negotiations to take 
place. With the threat of force and ICC indictment realized before mediations had begun, little 
leverage was left for mediation efforts to bring parties to the table. While the UN’s response was 
certainly ‘timely and decisive’, it was also incredibly disjointed. With the use of force 
authorized, Libya was now open to foreign military intervention, escalating the conflict already 
consuming the state.
 Mearsheimer offers a possible reason why the UN, known for its diplomatic and 
mediatory capabilities, was unable to get either side of the conflict to take negotiations seriously. 
“The theory [of liberal institutionalism] is of little relevance in situations where states’ interests 
are fundamentally conflictual and neither side thinks it has much to gain from cooperation.”241 
While aimed at interstate relations, this quote effectively captures the political situation that 
rebels and the Gaddafi regime, both vying to be the legitimate representative of the Libyan state, 
faced upon entering negotiations. With the use of force sanctioned and the US mission 
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established two days after, rebels had an incentive to wait and see whether the military 
intervention played out in their favor. Gaddafi had every incentive to wait it out as well, but for 
very different reasons. With an ICC indictment imminent, assets frozen, travel restricted, and 
foreign enemy forces authorized to ‘use all necessary measures,’ Gaddafi was confronted with 
the choice of dying in prison, dying at the hands of insurgents or NATO bombs, or fighting for 
his life. Given these diametrically opposed positions, created in part by Security Council 
mismanagement of coercive measures, nether side had anything to gain from negotiations. 
Foreign forces, then, would authoritatively determine the outcome of Libya’s civil war.
  The US initiated military engagement on 19 March 2011 with Operation Odyssey Dawn, 
but soon turned the mission over to NATO who deployed Operation Unified Protector on 31 
March. While France, the US, and Britain were the primary actors in the intervention, the 
mission consisted of a broad-based coalition of states, including Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates.242 Whereas the UN diplomatic response was muddled and disjointed, NATO action 
was highly coordinated and fine-tuned. During its operation NATO deployed over 9,700 strike 
sorties which destroyed over 5,900 military targets.243 As Evans acknowledges, “When it comes 
to capability at the hard-power end of the spectrum, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has a 
great deal going for it.”244 At the close of its seven month mission on 31 October 2011, the 
Western world largely viewed the mission as a great success. Two NATO officials declared that 
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the operation in Libya has “rightly been hailed as a model intervention.”245 If Operation Unified 
Protector is to serve as a model for interventions to come, it is worth examining the 
consequences of its air campaign on the populations it was meant to protect on the ground.
 Operation Unified Protector took a definitively offensive approach to its mandate to “take 
all necessary measures” to protect Libyan populations. Its actions, targeted against government 
forces and military capabilities, led to the destruction of thousands of buildings, material, and 
lives thought to be aiding the Gaddafi regime. Despite the care that NATO claims to have exerted 
in selecting targets and carrying out its missions, civilian lives were still lost.246 A Human Rights 
Watch investigation found that 72 civilian lives, of which 44 were women and children, had been 
taken by NATO air strikes.247 Despite the technological advancement of NATO’s weapons 
systems, the utilization of defective bombs, outdated intelligence, and a lack of ground personnel 
all led to mistakes which cost civilians’ their lives.248 
 Some may argue that 72 civilian deaths, while tragic, represent a very small number 
compared to the lives that could have been lost through a protracted conflict. This paper does not 
intend to be over-idealistic and recognizes that decisions, military or otherwise, take place in an 
imperfect world with imperfect information. Given this reality, 72 civilian casualties over a 
seven month engagement presents a rather low number for the intensity of the conflict and 
NATO measures being taken. However, regardless of whether 1 or 1,000 civilians are killed, this 
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paper rejects the notion that any human life is acceptable collateral damage. Any measure taken 
under the auspices of R2P that directly results in the loss of civilian life constitutes an imperfect 
exercise of the responsibility to protect. If the third pillar is to truly reflect a commitment to 
protecting populations from the horrors of mass atrocities, then strategic decisions must revolve 
around people, not politics.
 However, realists like Mearsheimer would hold absurd the idea that military 
considerations could revolve around anything other than power politics. Realism argues that, 
“wars should not be fought for idealistic purposes, but instead for balance-of-power reasons.”249 
Realism, then, would either assert that third pillar action is impossible in practice or is simply 
serves as a front for the ulterior motives of states. Statements by NATO officials following 
Operation Unified Protector seem to give credence to this realist view. In a jointly written article, 
Ivo Daalder (US Permanent Representative to NATO) and James Stavridis (Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe and Commander of the US European Command) assert that NATO 
“succeeded in protecting … civilians and, ultimately, in providing the time and space necessary 
for local forces to overthrow Muammar al-Qaddafi.”250 To have civilian protection buttressed 
against such a clearly political objective undermines the principle of neutrality which R2P is 
meant to employ. By firmly taking sides in the conflict, NATO undermined an already weak 
peace process. Even more disturbing, this quote reveals that NATO’s objectives extended beyond 
protecting populations; the organization sought to facilitate Gaddafi’s ouster.
  The influence of power politics in the implementation of pillar three poses a threat not 
only to the establishment of viable peace processes in the midst of a crisis, but to future victims 
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of mass atrocities as well. If NATO’s objective was to topple Gaddafi, it can look on Operation 
Unified Protector as a job well done without engaging in critical self-reflection about the human 
costs the operation entailed. As C.J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt argue, “The failure to thoroughly 
assess the civilian toll reduces the chances that allied forces, which are relying ever more heavily 
on air power rather than risking ground troops in overseas conflicts, will examine their Libyan 
experience to minimize collateral deaths elsewhere.251 However, pressure from organizations 
such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have forced NATO to at least pay lip-
service to a commitment to reevaluate its tactics to reduce civilian casualties in the future.252   
 According to Mearsheimer, “Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection 
of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of the 
great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior.”253 The third pillar of R2P, 
dealing with the controversial issue of coercive force, is all about power and how and why it is 
exerted. The case of Libya, the first-ever sanctioning of the use of force under R2P without the 
intervened state’s consent, demonstrates the susceptibility of the third pillar to ‘the self-interested 
calculations of great powers,’ represented in this case by NATO. The intervening forces’ focus on 
military victory over peace may have led to the ousting of an autocratic regime, but it did nothing 
to lay the groundwork for a transition to democratic governance. This lack of institutional 
development has left Libyans the victims of torture and indefinite detention, the same violations 
of human rights witnessed under the Gaddafi regime.254 Despite the election of a democratic 
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government in July of 2012, the Libyan state has shown little progress in controlling the 
proliferation of arms and securing the rule of law.255 The UN Support Mission in Libya 
(UNSMIL), established in September 2011, has much work to do in developing state institutions 
and good governance, work which would have been made easier by a commitment to this 
process at the onset of and throughout the conflict. 
 The Libyan case offers three lessons for the future of R2P. First, the modest but still 
significant reforms that were pursued prior to the uprising offered a critical opportunity for states 
to engage in their second pillar responsibilities and in turn help Libya uphold its own first pillar 
responsibilities. Therefore, a deeper commitment needs to be made to engage states before 
conflict breaks out. Second, the haphazard use of sanctions and quick recourse to the use of force 
offered by the Security Council before serious mediation efforts were underway jeopardized and 
ultimately undermined the potential for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. The Security Council 
in the future should approach sanctions as tools in the mediation process rather than symbolic 
gestures of disapproval. Finally, while realism can help states pragmatically weigh the cost of 
military intervention, the Libyan case reveals the desperate need to break out of an overly-realist 
conception of R2P which places the emphasis on punitive rather than protective policy and self-
interest over collective responsibility.  
A ‘Responsibility to Peace’
 It is this concern with the punitive rather than protective nature third pillar action has 
taken that animates O’Connell’s critique of R2P. O’Connell argues that the ‘new militarism’ of 
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humanitarian intervention out of which R2P has developed is antithetical to human rights, since 
the assurance of human rights are dependent on the presence of peace.256 Brazil’s proposal of a 
‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) mirrors O’Connell’s call for a reconceptualization of 
R2P into a ‘responsibility to peace’, as both seek to limit recourse to the use of force. Her 
exploration of the limitations and and dangers of military intervention provide critical insight 
into the third pillar and further underscores the need to rebalance the three pillars, lest R2P come 
to perpetuate the very harm it aims to prevent.
 Whereas R2P advocates trace the emergence of the norms underlying R2P, O’Connell 
traces the development of the ‘norm of peace’, or what Evans might cynically call the ‘norm of 
non-interference’. Indeed, Evans’s and O’Connell’s works appear to be in dialogue with each 
other, tracing parallel yet opposing norms of state behavior. Like R2P, O’Connell asserts that this 
norm is relatively new and has its origins in the UN Charter. 257 While both norms may draw 
from the same institutional source and be driven by the same desire to alleviate human suffering, 
O’Connell holds that any humanitarian principle that attempts to justify military intervention will 
inevitably lead to more suffering that it prevents. This is because, “Inherent in the idea of 
humanitarian intervention is the contradiction that it is acceptable to kill and injure some, even 
wholly innocent people; to preserve the human rights of others.”258 Such a contradiction is 
untenable to O’Connell, and should be to R2P advocates as well. The 72 lives that were lost as a 
direct result of NATO actions in Libya provide 72 reasons why military intervention cannot 
become the norm under R2P if the principle is to fulfill its mandate to protect populations.
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  While many R2P critics tend to focus on the vulnerability of third pillar action to the 
national interests of the intervening powers, O’Connell is willing to forgive the inherently self-
serving nature of humanitarian intervention should it prove to help prevent and mitigate mass 
atrocities.259 However, her interrogation of humanitarian intervention leads O’Connell to 
conclude that, “military intervention for humanitarian purposes, on balance, has accomplished 
more harm than good.”260 O’Connell, reflecting a sense of pragmatism which even Mearsheimer 
would admire, asserts that R2P supporters who attempt to excuse intervention’s poor record by 
blaming states’ unwillingness to fully and faithfully commit to all the responsibilities such 
intervention requires are deluding themselves. “[S]ince states are unlikely ever to commit the 
massive resources that may be necessary for successful humanitarian intervention, in complex 
multi-faction conflicts stretching over vast or inhospitable territory, this factor weights against 
changing the law in favor of intervention.”261 The falterings of the post-reconstruction effort in 
Libya attest to the international community’s limited commitment to long-term engagement, a 
reality which can only be altered through the strengthening of the second, not third, pillar.
 One of O’Connell’s criticisms in particular strikes at the very heart of why intervention in 
Libya not only failed to achieve R2P objectives in the short or long term, but also why it sets a 
dangerous precedent for future third pillar action: “International law recognizes the human right 
of self-determination and that right is violated when outside powers determine a community’s 
leadership.”262 This quote could be a direct response to NATO actions in Libya. It is clear from 






strategic priority as ending the conflict. At its best, these actions reflect a naive and dangerous 
belief that forcibly changing governments can fix systemic problems of inequality and 
oppression. At its worst, these actions put R2P in danger of becoming a cover for, and 
synonymous with, regime change. If R2P comes to symbolize the overthrowing of repressive 
regimes, all the good that could be achieved through a serious engagement with the first and 
second pillars will be lost to powerful states’ political manipulations of the third pillar. Libya 
provides the opportunity and imperative for a serious reevaluation of the international 
community’s engagement with R2P to date. More needs to be done to strengthen and develop the 
first two pillars, but this can only be done if states are willing to shift their focus and resources 
from the coercive logic and tactics of the third pillar. 
 Some have taken on this challenge and have begun to reconceptualize a more balanced 
R2P. Following the events in Libya, Brazilian delegates at the UN developed a concept paper on 
what they termed the ‘responsibility while protecting’ (RwP). Adopting the same three pillar 
framework constructed by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, RwP seeks to “constrain recourse to 
the use of force and partly even to pillar three action more generally.”263 Like O’Connell, Brazil 
took note that military intervention, regardless of its aims or intent, often causes more harm than 
it prevents.264 RwP contends that the “emphasis [of R2P] should be on preventive diplomacy as a 
means of reducing the risk of armed conflict in the first place.”265 This emphasis in turn demands 
that all diplomatic measures be explored and exhausted before third pillar action is considered. 
This linear approach to the three pillars (action must begin with the first pillar and only in 
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extreme cases end with the third) stands in contradiction to Ban Ki-moon’s repeated assertions 
that the three pillars are not chronological and that decisive action should not be beholden to an 
overly-rigid adherence to process over response.266 However, given the great cost – monetarily, 
materially, physically, psychologically, and otherwise – of any form of violence or warfare, this 
paper sees little problem with demanding a deeper commitment to cooperative and constructive 
engagement before states have recourse to military action.
 If a state still proves unwilling to protect its populations despite serious efforts by the 
international community to engage the state through mediatory measures, RwP recognizes that 
military action may need to be taken, but it holds that this action must have clearly articulated 
objectives prior to military engagement.267 This requirement provides a clear way to ensure that 
all states understand and come to consensus on the purpose of military action, as well as a way to 
hold states accountable during a military intervention. NATO action, justified under “all 
necessary measures” and the establishment of a no-fly zone, clearly went beyond the intended 
purposes of Security Council resolution 1973 (2011), but a straight reading of the resolution text 
offers little ground for concerned states to make this argument since NATO’s actions technically 
complied with the resolution’s mandate. Clearly defined objectives, then, could go a long way to 
ensuring that third pillar action conforms to the stated and primary purpose of R2P, to protect 
populations from mass atrocities.
 As O’Connell rightly states, “Supporters of the concept ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) 
promote it with the sincere aim of gaining greater respect for human rights in the world.”268 This 
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aim, however, is not always reflected by the actions states take, especially when it comes to 
coercive action under the third pillar of R2P. The Libyan case demonstrates that military action, a 
fundamentally realist exercise, is far too vulnerable to the political interests and manipulations of 
powerful states and to date has undermined the mandate of R2P. O’Connell offers a possible 
solution, a way to remedy the imbalance that the third pillar has caused: “If proponents of R2P 
begin to associate it with the additional R2P, responsibility to peace, the original concept will 
have a better chance of succeeding in the protection of human rights.”269 Absent this 
commitment to peace, however, O’Connell comes to the disheartening conclusion that, “To get 
states to focus again on peaceful means to promote human rights and prevent atrocities before 
they happen may well require abandoning the whole R2P enterprise. If the concept is becoming 
an obstacle to humanitarianism, its creators should not resist its passage into history.”270 
 This paper does not reach such a drastic conclusion, but it does agree that a serious 
reassessment of R2P is needed if the principle is not to become another tired excuse for regime 
overthrow and the use of force. As examined in the third chapter, realism as a theory can act as a 
check against grandiose military agendas. Realism in practice, however, has led to an 
overemphasis on military rather than mediatory measures, on coercion rather than cooperation, 
and the perceived immutability of state behavior rather than the dynamic potential of R2P. 
Hence, both the third pillar and realism must be checked and reassessed if R2P is to be an 
effective principle that can prevent the perpetration of mass atrocities. This reassessment is the 





 As Bellamy asserts, “through its articulation of a continuum of measures incorporating 
political and diplomatic strategies alongside legal, economic and military options, RtoP points 
towards holistic strategies of engagement that can overcome the temptation to conceive complex 
problems in exclusively military terms.”271 While true in theory, R2P has not yet achieved this in 
practice. As the Libyan case demonstrates, states were quick to conceive the crisis as a security 
issue in need of military action rather than the manifestation of structural violence and 
inequalities that needed to be collectively engaged and reformed through mediatory and 
diplomatic means. The expectations that the international community has established for 
potential perpetrators of mass atrocities – that cooperation will lead to indictment as was the case 
in Kenya and to some extent Darfur – pushes “their back against the wall” and forces them into a 
mindset where mass atrocity crimes appear to be the only viable option to preserve both their 
power and their lives.272 Military intervention, then, may ultimately serve to entrench genocidal 
policies rather than deter them. 
 While the evidence remains ambiguous, military intervention may also act as an incentive 
for oppressed populations or groups to seek the violent overthrow, rather than the peaceful 
reform, of repressive governments. This is not meant to be taken as a defense of autocratic 
regimes or genocidaires; rather, the articulation of such a possibility is meant to demonstrate that 
violence only begets more violence and fails to address the structural issues that lead to 
repression and abuse in the first place. These structural issues, therefore, are likely to persist in 
spite of new governance if opposition groups are brought to power through force. 
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 Military intervention, then, has thus far only served to augment the violence and suffering 
that R2P seeks to prevent. For this reason, the pillars of R2P are in serious need of restructuring. 
Both O’Connell and Brazilian UN delegates offer insight into how this might be done and the 
form that this restructuring could take. While R2P advocates may fear that losing recourse to the 
use of force means sacrificing R2P’s teeth or enforceability, these advocates must seriously 
consider the cost of such bite. If R2P is a commitment to protect populations from the crimes of 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, then it must also be a 
commitment against violence. Decades of realist foreign policy have led many states to pursue 
ever greater military capabilities at the cost of developing effective diplomatic tools. When all 
the tools in the foreign policy toolbox are hammers, every problem is treated like a nail. Thus, 
the international community’s implementation of R2P will continue to reflect a militaristic bias 
until states are led to develop other, less coercive tools. The development of stronger, more 
effective diplomatic tools and engagement will help to rebalance the three pillars of R2P. This 
rebalance, however, is unlikely to occur if military intervention remains a viable and 
unconditional option. 
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7. Rebalancing the Pillars of R2P and International Relations
 It is clear from the Libyan case that the third pillar, and by extension realism, remains the 
dominant prism through which R2P is perceived and pursued by academics and policymakers 
alike. Indeed, much of Bellamy’s and Evan’s work is devoted to defending R2P as a principle 
apart from humanitarian intervention, asserting that it offers more than just a justification for 
intervention.273 It is nearly impossible to see such cyclical debates ending as long as realist 
considerations on security (and insecurity) continue to disproportionately determine states’ 
foreign policy agendas. How can realism’s pervasive influence on the implementation of R2P be 
checked while still recognizing the contributions of the theory to international relations more 
generally? Adrian Gallagher’s exploration of the tensions between realism and R2P seeks to 
answer just this question, and in the process provides valuable insight into the path ahead for 
R2P.
 Gallagher begins his exploration with a recognition of the indisputable dominance of 
realism in global politics. In recognizing this, Gallagher contends that, “realism will continue to 
shape foreign policy responses toward normative commitments, such as the R2P, in the 
future.”274 The implementation of R2P has been most directly effected by realist prioritization of 
national interests over collective interests when it comes to foreign policy. The tension between 
the collective nature of R2P and the nationalistic quality of realist thought leads to what 
Gallagher calls a ‘clash of responsibilities’. When collective responsibilities appear to undermine 
a state’s domestic responsibilities, realism contends that “states have a national responsibility to 
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reject their international responsibility to protect.”275 It is this perceived ‘clash’ or incompatibility 
between national and collective interests that keeps R2P relegated to the sidelines of foreign 
policy, or at least until it can be utilized to further national interests. As Gallagher asserts, “For 
realists, complex and dangerous foreign policy agendas have the potential to undermine state 
security and should, therefore, only be pursued when matters of vital national interest are at 
stake.”276 States, therefore, are unlikely to pursue ‘altruistic’ goals if they face any risk in doing 
so.
 While human rights advocates might lament such a perspective, this pragmatism is not 
always ‘bad’ or immoral. In terms of R2P, such a view could lead to the more effective (and 
faithful) implementation of third pillar action under R2P. Realism’s skepticism regarding the 
plausibility of achieving human rights ends through military means can act as a necessary check 
on the blind undertaking of moralistic crusades which often bear unintended and detrimental 
consequences. While acknowledging that all scholars wish to live in a world free from mass 
atrocities, Gallagher asserts that the desire to eradicate these crimes should never be detached 
from political reality; basing foreign policy off of such aspirations alone will inevitable lead to 
‘flawed and dangerous’ results.277 The Libyan crisis is a case in point. Several billion (US) 
dollars and several thousand lives later, it is difficult to say that Libya is any more stable or 





278 Daadlder and Stavridis, “NATO’s Victory in Libya - The Right Way to Run an Intervention” and Ian Black, 
“Libyan revolution casualties lower than expected, says new government,” The Guardian, 8 January 2013, accessed 
29 April 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/08/libyan-revolution-casualties-lower-expected-
government. 
convenient) adherence to realism could therefore act as a vital check against the use of force 
under R2P. 
 Gallagher’s exploration of realism is not limited to the theory’s arguments on 
humanitarian intervention. In exploring some of realism’s principal arguments, Gallagher finds 
strong compatibility between the theory and R2P’s first and second pillars. Gallagher points to 
Hobbes, one of the founding fathers of realism, and finds that his arguments on the sovereign 
reflect some of the primary assertions of the first pillar of R2P. Gallagher contends that:
In essence, the sovereign state provides the political order required to overcome the 
violence, fear, and misery that it is proposed form the routine of everyday life within the 
context of the state of nature. When one considers that the R2P sets out to protect 
populations from the mass violence, mass fear, and mass misery inherent in genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, one hopes that realists and 
R2P advocates can forge an agreement that the ‘primary raison d’être and duty [of each 
individual state] is to protect its population’ from such mass atrocity crimes.279
Hence, the realist state and the first pillar of R2P share the same foundational mandate: to protect 
populations from acts that make life ‘nasty, brutish and short’. 
 Gallagher also asserts that the arguments that have led to realism’s rejection of the second 
pillar of R2P do not take into account the realities of the modern world. According to Gallagher, 
the theory’s rejection of the second pillar is based on realism’s belief in the importance of 
relative power. Under realism’s relative power rubric, the act of offering aid inherently decreases 
a state’s relative standing while increasing that of the receiving state. Hence, “consumer states 
(those who seek assistance) increase their power base and therefore their chances of survival at 
the expense of provider states, which are weakened through their chances of failure.”280 This 




collective benefit that states accrue from ensuring the stability and vitality of other states. 
Gallagher provides a contemporary example of where the failure to uphold second pillar 
obligations directly led to national insecurity: “the US stands as the world’s greatest military 
power, yet remains increasingly plagued by the problem of Somalian piracy. This international 
threat emerged precisely because Somalia was allowed to collapse.”281 This leads Gallagher to 
conclude that failing or troubled states increase the level of insecurity for all states, not just those 
experiencing instability, and hence should be the concern of the entire international 
community.282
 While the above argument is situated within the context of R2P, this fundamental truth 
was recognized by liberal scholars as far back as Kant: 
Since the community of the nations of the earth, in a narrower or broader way, has 
advanced so far that an injustice in one part of the world is felt in all parts, the idea of a 
cosmopolitical right is no phantastic and strained form of the conception of right, but 
necessary to complete the unwritten code, not only of the rights of states but of peoples as 
well, so as to make it coextensive with the rights of men in general, through the 
establishment of which perpetual peace will come.283
That this truth, articulated before the world wars, before Rwanda, before Kosovo and yet ignored 
by realism, attests to the need to rebalance not only the pillars of responsibility, but the 
theoretical pillars that guide international relations as well. The insights of liberalism and 
constructivism, while frequently paid lip service by world leaders, deserve serious development 
and implementation as well. No one theory can explain or account for all the complexities of the 
international system, a fact which underscores the need for a multi- and not mono-theoretical 
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enthusiastic idealism and ensuring that foreign policy has realistically achievable objectives. But 
constructivism and liberalism also have much to add to the discussion. Wendt’s insight into the 
institutional, and not inherent, nature of self-help and power politics should compel states to 
explore what features of international relations perpetuate these logics and how state-to-state 
interactions must change to address them.284 The preponderance of collective action problems 
states face – from the environment to financial regulation to drug trafficking – underscores 
Keohane’s call that, “global issues require systematic policy coordination and that such 
coordination require institutions.”285 A liberal approach to foreign policy could lead states to look 
for avenues of cooperation and mutual gains, potentially decreasing the insecurity of the 
international system. Each pillar is necessary but insufficient on its own to understand and 
navigate global politics or effectively implement all three pillars of R2P. 
 Through his interrogation of realism, Gallagher methodologically shows that realism 
does not stand in contradiction to the goals of R2P. If utilized correctly, realism can enhance 
rather than undermine the principle and its implementation. R2P could benefit greatly from the 
pragmatic approach to foreign policy heralded by realism, and national security – a primary 
concern for realists – could be further guaranteed through each state’s faithful execution of all 
R2P pillars of responsibility. The establishment of norms of cooperation, the realm of 
constructivism and liberalism, will require that these two theories are also utilized to develop a 
holistic approach to foreign policy and to R2P. Only when all three pillars, both theoretical and 
those of R2P, are balanced will the protection of populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity be realized.
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8. Conclusions
 This paper set out to explore whether the three pillars of international relations theory – 
constructivism, liberalism, and realism – could be utilized to help elucidate and enhance one’s 
understanding of the development and implementation of the ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ a 
recently adopted principle and emerging norm in global politics. In examining the central tenets 
and arguments of these three theories, it was found that a strong relationship exists between these 
theoretical ‘pillars’ and the three pillars of R2P. The aspirations and goals of each R2P pillar 
reflect the insights and influence that these three theories have had on the formation of foreign 
policy. The first pillar, concerned with developing a new norm of a ‘responsibility to protect’ and 
redefining what it means to be a sovereign, is supported by constructivism’s arguments regarding 
the power ideas can have on the formation and reformation of state identity and interest. The 
second pillar, devoted to fostering cooperation between states to prevent the occurrence of mass 
atrocities, reflects liberal beliefs that institutions, economic interdependence, and democratic 
governance can reduce insecurity and lead to peace. The third pillar, which seeks to compel the 
international community to a ‘timely and decisive’ response in the face of mass atrocities, is 
enhanced and undermined by realism’s insights into power and the challenges institutions face in 
overcoming self-interest and self-help in the security realm. 
 In developing these parallels, this paper found that the three ‘parallel’ pillars are in dire 
need of rebalancing if R2P is to fulfill its objective of protecting populations from genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. While realism’s insights can help 
restrain policymakers from setting unrealistic and dangerous agendas, the dominance of realism 
in policymaking circles has thus far prevented the faithful implementation of all three pillars of 
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R2P. An examination of Darfur, Kenya, and Libya demonstrates the limitations of coercive 
action and underscore the need for states to take seriously their first and second pillar 
obligations. However, it is unlikely given realism’s dominance in foreign policy that states will 
commit to developing effective first and second pillar policy while coercive force remains a 
viable tool in fulfilling R2P responsibilities. Hence, a reconsideration of coercive force’s role in 
the realization of R2P is needed, a process which academics and policymakers alike have begun 
as evidenced through the conceptualization of a ‘responsibility to peace’ and ‘Responsibility 
while Protecting’. This reconceptualization does not necessarily mean the rejection of realism; 
rather, it requires a reevaluation of its assumptions and assertions, one which academics like 
Gallagher have initiated and which show promise in mitigating the seeming incompatibilities 
between realism and the first and second pillars. 
 In examining these ‘parallel pillars’, this paper has found that the three international 
relations theories do indeed have much to say in relation to the principle of R2P. Whether their 
insights will be heeded is yet to be seen. What is certain, however, is that R2P could benefit 
greatly from a rebalancing of the theoretical and R2P pillars. Only by rebalancing these pillars 
can advocates and policymakers alike reduce the vulnerability of R2P to power considerations 
and potential abuse. 
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Appendix: Defining the Mass Atrocity Crimes
This appendix serves as a quick reference regarding the four atrocity crimes stipulated by R2P. 
This section draws from international conventions, statutes, and academic sources to define these 
crimes. The relevant articles and sections have been reproduced below.
A. Genocide
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was approved and 
proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III)  
on 9 December 1948. The Convention entered into force on 12 January 1951. The full text of the 
Convention can be found in the United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 78, p. 277. Genocide is hence 
defined as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Contracting Parties Confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of 
war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.
ARTICLE II
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
ARTICLE III
The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 
(d) Attempt to commit genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.
B. Ethnic Cleansing
The term ‘ethnic cleansing’, derived from the Serbo-Croatian phrase etnicko ciscenje, was 
originally employed to describe the events that occurred in the former Yugoslavia during the 
1990s. Given the term’s lack of legal status, the Secretary-General concludes that “Ethnic 
cleansing is not a crime in its own right under international law, but acts of ethnic cleansing may 
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constitute one of the other three crimes.”286 The term was nevertheless used in the “Final Report 
of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 780 (1992)”, a report which investigated the crimes perpetrated during the Yugoslav 
conflict. 
For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ refers to “the attempt to create 
ethnically homogeneous geographic areas through the deportation or forcible displacement of 
persons belonging to particular ethnic groups,” an act which can involve “the removal of all 
physical vestiges of the targeted group through the destruction of monuments, cemeteries, and 
houses of worship.”287
C. War Crimes
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on 17 July 1998 and entered 
into force on 1 July 2002. Reflecting amendments to the Statute through 16 January 2002, the 
Statute defines ‘war crimes’ as follows:
ARTICLE VIII: War Crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part 
of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes" means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following 
acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva 
Convention:
(i) willful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(iii) Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a 
hostile Power;
(vi) Willfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair 
and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, 
within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
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(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not 
military objectives;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be 
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings 
which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no 
longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and 
uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems 
of the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injury;
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or 
parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the 
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical mutilation or 
to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither justified by the 
medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or 
her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person 
or persons;
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and 
actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war 
directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before 
the commencement of the war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault; 
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
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(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets 
with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with 
incisions;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a 
nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently 
indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that 
such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a 
comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an 
amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 
123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment;
(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain 
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and 
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in 
conformity with international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them 
of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies 
as provided for under the Geneva Conventions;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national 
armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 
3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following 
acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of 
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, 
wounds, detention or any other cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment;
(iii) Taking of hostages;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial 
guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.
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(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of 
the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, 
and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in 
conformity with international law;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the 
protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed 
conflict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, 
science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the 
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined 
in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions;
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed forces or 
groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
(viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the 
conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons 
so demand;
(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to physical 
mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind which are neither 
justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor 
carried out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the 
health of such person or persons;
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure 
be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict;
(xiii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xiv) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices;
! Muscott 100
(xv) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets 
with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with 
incisions.
(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not 
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in 
the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.
Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or 
re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, 
by all legitimate means.
D. Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity are also defined by the Rome Statute to the International Criminal 
Court. The relevant articles define these crimes as follows:
ARTICLE VII: Crimes Against Humanity
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts 
when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian 




(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules 
of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in 
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1:
! Muscott 101
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, 
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part 
of a population;
(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking 
in persons, in particular women and children;
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement of the persons 
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully 
present, without grounds permitted under international law;
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture 
shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions;
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other 
grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as 
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy;
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to 
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity;
(h) "The crime of apartheid" means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in 
paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression 
and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed 
with the intention of maintaining that regime;
(i) "Enforced disappearance of persons" means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, 
or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on 
the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the 
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term "gender" refers to the two sexes, 
male and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not indicate any 
meaning different from the above.
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